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TO THE AGE OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION: AS PAPAL REJOINDER,
"THE APOCALYPSE IS NOT NOW"
You throw the sand against the wind...
Blown back they blind the mocking Eye
But still in Israel's path they shine.'
WILLIAM JOSEPH WAGNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Church promulgated its social doctrine, over more than a cen-
tury, in answer to the political, social and economic upheavals of an
era, now past, that may be termed the Age of Social Revolution. 2 The
accretion of the papal and conciliar pronouncements comprising this
body of material commenced in 1891 as the advance shadow of the Rus-
sian Revolution only just loomed over Europe.3 A comprehensive summa-
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture,
Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America; B.A., The University
of California, Los Angeles (1975);J.D., Yale University Law School (1978); Ph.D.,
The Catholic University of America (2002).
1. William Blake, Mock on, Mock on, Voltaire, Rousseau, in THE Top 500 POEMS
382 (William Harmon ed., 1992).
2. Hannah Arendt asserts that "revolutions" have "determined the physiog-
nomy of the twentieth century." She defines the "modern concept of revolution,"
which like Pope Benedict she asserts has "outlived" its "ideological justification" as
"inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins
anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before is about to
unfold." She observes that
The social question began to play a revolutionary role only when in the
modem age and not before, men began to doubt that poverty is inherent
in the human condition, to doubt that the distinction between the 'few,
who through circumstances or strength or fraud had succeeded in liber-
ating themselves from the shackles of poverty, and the laboring poverty-
stricken multitude was inevitable and eternal.'
HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 1, 15, 21 (1963). "The centennial of Rerum
novarum coincides with the collapse of Marxism-Leninism as a world system of so-
cial, political, and economic order. We now possess ample empirical evidence of
the disastrous consequences of the socialist idea when it is incarnated in totalitar-
ian dictatorship and state communism." Leonid Kishkovsky, An Ecumenical After-
ward, in A CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 177-78 (George Weigel &
Robert Royal eds., 1991). See generally LILLIAN PARKER WALLACE, LEO XIII AND THE
RISE OF SOCIALISM (1966); CHURCH AND SOCIETr: CATHOLIC SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND MOVEMENTS 1789-1950 (Joseph Moody ed., 1953).
3. "Leo's main purpose was to speak out not against Marxist revolution but
against the exploitation of workers carried out in the name of liberal capitalism."
DONAL DoRR, OPTION FOR THE POOR: A HUNDRED YEARS OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL
TEACHING 13-19 (2001).
As early as 1848 (the year Marx and Engels published the Communist Man-
ifesto), Ketteler declared that 'the task of religion, the task of the Catholic
societies in the immediate future, has to do with social conditions.' He
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tion of Catholic social doctrine became timely with the historic downfall of
the Marxist Soviet Union, as of 1989. 4 The Compendium on the Social Doc-
trine of the Church was first proposed in 1997 and was subsequently issued in
2004.5 In his recent encyclical Deus caritas est6 Pope Benedict XVI offers a
global assessment of the errors, in attitude and in modes of reasoning,
found in the revolutionary ideologies to which the Church, during this
period, gave reply, but also, critically, a caution to Christians to avoid more
continued: 'The world will see that to the Catholic Church is reserved the
definite solution of the social question; for the State, with all its legislative
machinery, has not the power to solve it.' . . . Rerum Novarum was so
influenced by it that Leo XIII referred to Ketteler as 'my great
predecessor.'
Thomas C. Kohler, Quadregesimo Anno, in A CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT 29-30 (George Weigel & Robert Royal eds., 1991). Commentators have
noted that "[t] he encyclical was, in part, a response to the ideas of Marxist social-
ism .... Pope Leo XIII's encyclical addresse(s] socialism and its implications."
Kishkovsky, supra note 2, at 177. Kishkovsky further noted that, "[T]otalitarian
ideologies... threatened humanity in the twentieth century... [growing] in the
soil of Christian civilization.". Kishkovsky, supra note 2, at 178. Kishkovsky contin-
ued his Ecumenical Afterward, stating that "Karl Marx... created... [his] theor[y]
at the heart of Christian Europe. The emergence of totalitarian, anti-Christian
ideologies in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe was a profound challenge
to the Christian faith." Kishkovsky, supra note 2, at 178.
All of these political events created a context in which the status of the
Church, to say nothing of its role in society, was constantly questioned if
not put in jeopardy. The situation was not the best for the Church to
initiate social reform, but such reform movements nonetheless made
their appearance.
Thomas A. Shannon, Commentary on Rerum novarum (The Condition of Labor), in
MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING (Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M. & Lisa Sowle Ca-
hill eds., 2005).
4. "The year 1989 led to dramatic revolutions in the political and intellectual
landscape of Europe that no one could have predicted even a short time before."
JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT FOR EUROPE 81 (Brian McNeil
trans., Ignatius Press 1994) [hereinafter RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT].
The historical upheaval of 1989 also brought about a change of topic in
theology. Liberation theology, understood in political terms, had given a
new, political shape to questions about redemption and the world's hope
.... In doing so, however, it had presented politics with a task it could
not fulfill.
JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, MANY RELIGIONS-ONE COVENANT: ISRAEL, THE
CHURCH AND THE WORLD 17 (Graham Harrison trans., Ignatius Press 1999).
5. The suggestion for the compendium first arose at the Synod of American
bishops held in Rome in 1997. See Synod of Bishops, Special Assembly for
America, Encounter with the Living Jesus Christ: The Way to Conversion, Communion and
Solidarity in America, Instrumentum Laboris, Vatican City (The General Secretariat of
the Synod of Bishops & Libreria Editrice Vaticana 1997), available at http://www.
vatican.va/romancuria/synod/documents/rcsynod_doc_ 01091997_usa-instrla-
boren.html. The suggestion was incorporated in the pontifical response of John
Paul II in his Ecclesia in America. JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTA-
TION Ecclesia in America 1 54 (1999). The Compendium on the Social Doctrine of
the Church was published by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace in 2004.
6. BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DEUS CARITAS EST (2006), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf ben-
xvi-enc 20051225_deus-caritas-est-en.html [hereinafter DEUS CARITAS EST].
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subtle, but still parallel errors of their own, as they receive and apply the
Compendium. Ultimately forward-looking, the encyclical draws on its in-
sights into the meaning of the past, to prescribe a framework to guide,
inspire and direct the Church on issues of Church and State, as our pre-
sent chapter of history unfolds, the world stage now swept clear of the
broken statues of Lenin and Marx.
In the recent pages of this law review, an article by Cardinal Avery
Dulles, S.J. places the teaching of Pope Benedict XVI on Church and polit-
ics within the longer development of relevant Catholic doctrine. 7 Cardi-
nal Dulles establishes that the Pope regards the formal conceptual dualism
in the political theory advanced by the great Catholic theologians of the
high middle ages as marking, in effect, even today, the Catholic tradition's
fundamental orientation on politics. 8 Cardinal Dulles references the thir-
teenth century framework of Thomas Aquinas andJohn of Paris, assigning
the State, its temporal, and the Church, its spiritual authority, in a distinc-
tive interlocking pattern of dual jurisdiction over human affairs. 9 Cardinal
Dulles ultimately concludes that the current pontiff sets out his thinking
in the recent encyclical on the relation of Church to politics, as a "course
correction," not just in relation to Marxism, but, as well, in response to
certain late twentieth century trends in Catholic thought on politics, he
finds to be outside the authentic trajectory of Catholic doctrine. 10
Of actual indifference to Cardinal Dulles's purposes in his excellent
article, an anomaly, nonetheless, appears in Pope Benedict's own account
when Cardinal Dulles aligns it with his standard of continuity in the devel-
opment of the Church's doctrine on politics. Cardinal Dulles, as men-
tioned, accords normative standing to a position of Thomas Aquinas's.
Yet, a closer reading of Pope Benedict's theological and philosophical un-
derpinnings in his encyclical indicates an unmistakable preference on the
Pope's part for Augustine, over Aquinas.
The Church has but one doctrine, but it has, as we know, provided
harbor to a rich diversity of ideas over the centuries, with characteristic
multi-sided hospitality, in particular, to a variety of channels of thought,
associated with, among others, the separable discourses of the Benedic-
tine, Dominican, Franciscan and Jesuit Orders.1 The Catholic tradition,
7. See generally Cardinal Avery Dulles, S.J., The Indirect Mission of the Church to
Politics, 52 VILL. L. REv. 241 (2007) [hereinafter Dulles].
8. Cardinal Dulles observes that "Thomas Aquinas and his disciple John of
Paris adopted a mediating position, teaching that natural law gives a measure of
autonomy to each of the two powers." Id. at 242. In context, one infers that their
position sets the standard of the Church's commitment to Church-State dualism,
avoiding impermissible extremes in elevating the Church or State above the other.
9. See id.
10. Id. at 241-52.
11. One commentator wrote that "the Catholic Church also has a rich and
continually developing history of different religious orders, devotional styles, min-
istries and apostolates." JOSEPH A. VARACALLi, THE CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE IN
AMERICA 131 (2006). The commentator further explained that "[g]iven the fact
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as many have observed, maintains its unity in the face of this multiplicity
by balancing a liberal respect for plural charisms and intellectual tempera-
ments, all at once native to its larger tradition-a tradition which, in its
own way, is free-flowing and commodious-with a characteristic jealous
attention to universal agreement on those points of doctrine it discovers to
be essential to its basic identity and its common life. 12
In matters relating to politics, the Church famously has given quarter,
at once, to the temperamentally opposing schools of Thomism and Augus-
tinianism, and, within limits, of Franciscan voluntarism and Dominican
intellectualism. 13 In the case at hand, a concept from Thomas aptly is
used by Cardinal Dulles formally to map the contours of orthodox doctri-
nal development, but the Pope himself is still free to adopt a position
based on another important strand of the tradition. Accepting, as givens,
the boundaries of orthodox development in doctrine that Cardinal Dulles
charts usefully and well, and also the assumption that the Pope, as Cardi-
nal Dulles hardly surprisingly affirms, teaches within these, we are led to
ask what difference, the distinctive philosophical and theological inspira-
tion animating Pope Benedict's particular approach to the relation of
Church and politics, might make.
Cardinal Dulles's doctrinal analysis suggests a productive secondary
line of speculative reflection into the significance of the distinctive theo-
logical and philosophical underpinnings of the Pope's approach to
Church, politics and State. This present article is devoted to pursuing that
line of inquiry. It seeks to account for the pedigree, more specifically, of
Pope Benedict's vision of Church-State relations, at once within the Augus-
tinian school of thought, and within the larger family of platonic and ide-
alist modes of political thought to which Augustine, more generally,
that the Catholic Church understands itself as [an] institution that has successfully
'spanned the ages,' it should come as no surprise that it has accumulated a multi-
plicity of ways of expressing devotion to God." Id. at 134.
[T]he Church Universal . .. is blessed with a multitude of religious or-
ders .... Religious orders are shaped by the specific charismatic gift
given by God to its founder. The founders, in turn, are to some degree,
influenced by the social and historical milieu that they found themselves
immersed in and discovering the needs to be addressed .... In Catholi-
cism, there is also a legitimate variety of ways by which one can serve God
and through God both Church and society.
Id. at 132-37.
12. See generally KARL ADAM, THE SPIRIT OF CATHOLICISM (Justin McCann
trans., 1935).
13. See Gustav Spiller, Volunteerism and Intellectualism: A Reconciliation, in THE
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 500-01 (J.A. Leigh-
ton ed., 1904); see also History of Theology, in 7 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,
THE NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 26-31 (1967). Pope Benedict in his address at
Regensburg on September 12, 2006, Faith, Reason, and the University: Memories and
Reflections, contrasts unfavorably the voluntarism of Duns Scotus with the intellectu-
alism of Augustine and Thomas. BENEDICT XVI, ADDRESS AT REGENSBURG: FAITH,
REASON, AND THE UNIVERSITY: MEMORIES AND REFLECTIONS (Sept. 12, 2006) [herein-
after ADDRESS AT REGENSBURG].
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belongs. It aims, as well, to identify and explain what is original in Pope
Benedict's mode of applying, under exigent contemporary conditions, ele-
ments he incorporates from these traditions.
This article concludes ultimately that, as he revivifies political Augus-
tinianism, the Holy Father makes two original contributions. He draws on
ideas foreign to Augustine, but familiar, respectively, within ancient and
modern idealist political philosophy, to secure a basis for endorsing the
agenda of the Activist State Augustine would have been compelled to re-
ject. He adopts, as well, the modern construct of Constitutionalism, also
unknown to Augustine, to fashion what, ultimately, is not so much a politi-
cal or moral philosophy, but a philosophy of law devised to animate a par-
ticular vision of Church-State relations. In its concluding section, the
article calls attention both to the distinctive value of the Pope's position,
but also seeks to suggest that-in the high-stakes game of the Church's
dialogue with a post-Christian culture-there may be wisdom, even as one
proceeds to implement Pope Benedict's program, in cultivating mindful-
ness of the diversified options in moral and political philosophy and in
theologies of Church, ever alive in the larger Catholic tradition.
In a first section, this article, thus, sketches the outlines of the Augus-
tinianism and Idealist political philosophy, both Ancient and Modern, in-
fluencing Pope Benedict's political philosophy. In a second section, it sets
out Pope Benedict's political philosophy. In a third, it adumbrates Pope
Benedict's theology of Church. In a fourth, it sets forth Pope Benedict's
vision of legal ordering of Church-State relations, and, in its concluding
fifth section, it comments on the nature and limits of Pope Benedict's dis-
tinctive contribution.
II. UNDERSTANDING AUGUSTINIANISM AND IDEALIST POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY AS INFLUENCES ON POPE BENEDICT'S POLITICAL THOUGHT
While the concept of separate and concurrent jurisdictions of Church
and State, as Thomas Aquinas articulates it, can be taken as the touchstone
of the authentic trajectory over time of Catholic doctrine on politics, 14 the
Pope does not primarily draw from the intellectualist and Aristotelian
strand of the Catholic tradition associated with Aquinas in building his
own position. He opts instead, to rely, in fact brilliantly and systematically,
on the great alternative recognized within the Catholic tradition to the
Thomist-Aristotelean synthesis: the Augustinianism that arises decisively
from Plato. 15 He integrates Augustinian postulates within his own posi-
14. See Dulles, supra note 7, at 243.
15. "Although Augustine founded no school or system, properly speaking,
even before his death the influence of his thought had won him a position of
eminence and authority that remained unique and unchallenged for more than
800 years." Augustinianism, in I CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA, THE NEW CATHO-
LIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 1064 (1967). The entry continues that this lasted throughout
the thirteenth century, until "a new Augustinian synthesis began to emerge con-
taining, besides its theological components, philosophical notions taken from St.
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tion, moreover, in a manner deriving, more specifically, from a certain
return to Plato and resort, as well, to Plato's latter-day progeny and Augus-
tine's cousin several-times removed, philosopher of German idealism, Im-
manuel Kant. 16
While the theological cast of his political thought most closely resem-
bles Augustine's, Pope Benedict, in fact, resolves certain problems created
by Augustine by reviving a postulate of Platonism Augustine abandons,
and by borrowing elements, not envisioned by either Augustine or Plato,
from Kant. Knowledge of the political concepts supplied by idealism, in
both its classical platonic and modern nineteenth century forms, thus, as-
sists, in arriving at a precise statement of the powerful but ultimately
nuanced role of Augustinianism for Pope Benedict. As we will see, Pope
Benedict traces the errors of the Age of Social Revolution to a false turn
within the larger tradition of modern German idealism. An awareness of
the ways in which Pope Benedict simultaneously relies on this tradition,
therefore, permits a more pinpoint identification of precisely where Pope
Benedict, while remaining in sync with modernity, actually parts ways with
it.
As background to considering the political philosophy of Pope Bene-
dict, the following subsections explore, then, in turn, each of the follow-
ing: the relevant general outlines of St. Augustine's political philosophy;
Plato as a second precursor; and Pope Benedict's dialectic of compromise
with German Idealism.
A. Pope Benedict's Principal Precursor: St. Augustine
Pope Benedict grounds the Church-State dualism he embraces, in sat-
isfaction of Cardinal Dulles's measure of an authentically Catholic per-
spective on social justice, in a vision of politics he derives from St.
Augustine. For Augustine, and for Pope Benedict who follows him in this,
the dualism of Church and State, occurs, not within a pattern of differenti-
ated ascending levels of natural and uncreated being and knowing, fitting
ultimately into a unitary vision, as in Aquinas, but within an interplay of
human and divine freedom that assumes a division in the human will that
sunders the human capacity to know and choose, itself, to yield opposing
epistemologies and even ontologies. For Augustine, knowledge is dichoto-
mized as either formed by the light of the measure of the love of God or
Augustine or at least reputed to be Augustinian in origin. This resulting doctrinal
amalgam championed mainly within the Franciscan order in what has come to be
known as medieval or scholastic Augustinianism." Id. at 1065. Augustinianism saw
a seventeenth and eighteenth century revival in response to Protestantism andJan-
senism. It remains a source and inspiration for many and diversified currents of
thought. Augustinianism has been an influence in response to mechanistic and
materialist systems as well as to rationalism and idealisms in such thinkers as "Berg-
son, Scheler, Lavelle Sciacca, Carlini, Kierkegaard, and Jaspers." Id. at 1067-68.
16. See generally DIETER HEINRICH, BETWEEN KANT AND HEGEL: LECrruRES ON
GERMAN IDEALISM (David S. Pacini ed., 2003).
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deformed by the darkness of love of self. Each orientation gives rise to its
own epistemology. The pursuit of choice under the terms of these oppos-
ing modes of knowing gives rise to opposing ontologies, of being in the
universal harmony of the order of God's love and of a deprivation of being
by reason of a rupture of due order brought about through selfishness.1 7
The Augustinian vision of politics that follows upon this foregoing
preamble is readily distinguishable from that of St. Thomas cited by Cardi-
nal Dulles as paradigm. Thomas Aquinas premises the institutional and
organizational features of social life, no less than the bifurcation of
spheres between Church and State, on a "dualism of nature and grace."
In Thomas's two-tiered approach, the meaning of social life and the role
of the State are knowable as necessary modes of participating in created
being. They are intelligible through rational cognition without reference
to Christian faith or revelation. In this vision, the gift of grace and re-
vealed insight are, at one and the same time, necessary if one is to know
and pursue a fuller concomitant perfection in relation to the "higher"
end, now through Christ's grace accessible, of divine favor and eternal
happiness. 18 The overarching unity of Aquinas's scheme derives from the
unity of being and knowing across ascending and analogical levels of real-
ity. St. Thomas explicates his vision of Church-State dualism, which Cardi-
nal Dulles cites, within this hierarchically coordinated schema of unity and
difference in which the ultimate stress falls on unity.
17. And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is
undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to
cleave as its end, and becomes a kind of end to itself .... This falling
away is spontaneous; for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of
that higher and changeless good by which it was illumined to intelligence
and kindled into love, it would not have turned away to find satisfaction
in itself, and so become frigid and benighted .... Consequently, that it is
a nature, this is because it is made by God; but that it falls away from Him,
this is because it is made out of nothing. But man did not so fall away as
to become absolutely nothing; but being turned towards himself, his be-
ing became more contracted than it was when he clave to Him who su-
premely is .... For it is good to have the heart lifted up, yet not to one's
self, for this is proud, but to the Lord, for this is obedient, and can be the
act only of the humble .... But pious humility enables us to submit to
what is above us; and nothing is more exalted above us than God; and
therefore humility, by making us subject to God, exalts us ....
SAINT AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 460 (14:13) (Rev. Marcus Dods., M.A. trans., Mod-
em Library Edition, 1871) (1477) [hereinafter CITY OF GOD].
18. In every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dic-
tate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates that something ought
to be done or to be avoided. These are called "moral" precepts: since
human morals are based on reason.-[sic]At the same time there are
other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the very dictate
of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obli-
gation of something due or undue); but from some institution, divine or
human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts ....
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theoligica, in BAsic WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS
AQUINAS 920 (I.II. Q. 104 Art. 1) (Random House 1945) (1265-1274).
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In Augustine's schema, by contrast, human moral experience takes
shape separately in either of two distinct spheres. One sphere belongs to
the will turned in adoration towards God, and the other to the self turned
in on itself in self-love. 19 Both spheres serve as venues for human choice
and conduct, the first by the Elect inspired by love of God, and the second
by the Unredeemed absorbed in self-love.20 In contrast to Thomas, Au-
gustine views human beings as radically tending to inhabit one sphere or
the other as a matter of a fundamental inborn or acquired inclination. He
assumes that most people inhabit the sphere of self-love, so that the State,
concerned to facilitate temporal peace, coordinates common conduct
among the whole of humanity on terms intelligible to the unredeemed
masses, who are blind to moral principle, while the Church, for its part,
guides the path of the minority who can truly see.
2 1
Augustine's division of human moral experience into spheres orien-
tated to opposing inclinations of the will, as well as the Church-State di-
chotomy that accompanies it, has room for no ultimate resolution,
through unity posited by way of a higher, deeper or more inclusive state of
being or mode of knowledge, as is the case in St. Thomas. Its ultimate
19. Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by
the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of
God, even to the contempt of self .... In the one, the princes and the
nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling; in the other, the
princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying,
while the former take thought for all.
SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 47 (1:35) (J.G. Pilkington trans., 1876) [hereinaf-
ter CONFESSIONS].
20. But the families which do not live by faith seek their peace in the
earthly advantages of this life; while the families which live by faith look
for those eternal blessings which are promised, and use as pilgrims such
advantages of time and of earth as do not fascinate and divert them from
God, but rather aid them to endure with greater ease, and to keep down
the number of those burdens of the corruptible body which weigh upon
the soul. Thus the things necessary for this mortal life are used by both
kinds of men and families alike, but each has its own peculiar and widely
different aim in using them. The earthly city, which does not live by faith,
seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered con-
cord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men's wills to
attain the things which are helpful to this life. The heavenly city, or
rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use
of this peace only because it must, until this mortal condition which ne-
cessitates it shall pass away.
CITY OF GoD, supra note 17, at 695 (19:17).
21. But the peace which is peculiar to ourselves we enjoy now with God
by faith, and shall hereafter enjoy eternally with Him by sight. But the
peace which we enjoy in this life, whether common to all or peculiar to
ourselves, is rather the solace of our misery than the positive enjoyment
of felicity. Our very righteousness, too, though true in so far as it has
respect to the true good, is yet in this life of such a kind that it consists
rather in the remission of sins than in the perfecting of virtues. Witness
the prayer of the whole city of God in its pilgrim state, for it cries to God
by the mouth of all its members, "Forgive us our debts as we forgive our
debtors."
Id. at 707-08 (19:27).
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resolution occurs, for St. Augustine, rather at the end of history in God's
sovereign freedom, as he judges the living and the dead. A subordinate
and provisional, functional sort of unity does, however, arise in the Augus-
tinian schema for the interim, as the good and bad alike act in common
within the temporal order. This unity has its own comprehensive
character.
For St. Augustine, the principle that gives shape to each separate
sphere of human moral experience has, each in its own way, universal
reach extending as well to encompass a dimension of the opposing
sphere. For instance, the principle of interpersonal respect that gives so-
cial life its intrinsic comprehensive order within the sphere of moral expe-
rience that is oriented to justice in the true sense, that is within the
Church, also serves, within society generally, as the extrinsic measure of
order when the State metes out punishment to those overstepping bound-
aries in the use of temporal goods.
The principle of self-regard, conversely, which is the intrinsic princi-
ple of interpersonal relations within the experience of the majority gov-
erned by the State, likewise, expands to encompass the whole of human
affairs by, for its part, becoming the measure, even for the Just, i.e., those
in the Church, defining the scope of terms in contests to be adjudicated
over temporal goods.
In a double movement, then, each of the principles defining the two
separate spheres of human experience, considered metaphysically and
ontologically, serves, in this intersecting fashion, to contribute, on a cer-
tain level, to a unitary understanding of the whole of society and human
experience, when considered concretely and historically. This unity
emerges only concretely within history. An interlocking dialectic of two
opposing principles of knowing and choosing, gives rise, historically and
concretely, to just one State functioning to govern all, good and bad alike.
In Augustine, the common ground making possible the organization
of the State is its value to all, good and bad alike, for making secure the
possession of temporal goods. The unredeemed mass of people value this
security because of its meaning to their self-love. The Redeemed do so for
the value such goods have in mediating intrinsic goods, or instrumentally
to attaining intrinsic goods. The Redeemed discern and automatically re-
spect the just allocation of temporal goods, without any interposing coer-
cion. The State brings about the emergence of a comprehensive and
inclusive order of societal cooperation, precisely, by giving incentives to
the Unredeemed to honor the principal of mutuality, but out of selfish
fear of loss under a regime of coercion. The State exists to ensure social
cooperation, by bringing the Unredeemed, through its mechanisms of so-
cial coercion, into conformity with the standards of conduct the Re-
deemed observe out of the inner integrity of a good will.
The State maintains its order by guaranteeing security to all in their
possession of temporal goods, the gain of which is desired, and the loss of
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which is feared by all, even by those who are deranged from an ordered
love of intrinsic goods. Whether a given framework of human social and
political organization deserves to be considered a State depends, for Au-
gustine on whether it coordinates conduct, however amoral the motiva-
tions of all or most people may be with their undue attachment to self-
interest, according to the true measure ofjustice, as this measure appears
to one who considers the intrinsic dignity of all, as this dignity appears to
one who loves with the universal love of God.22
Where the State fails to allocate benefits and burdens by the measure
of true justice, the alleged State, then, brokering, as it must, interests ac-
cording to the norm of self-interest and power alone inexorably descends
to become nothing more, in fact, for Augustine, than a band of robbers.
23
Whether or not the polity is, in fact, oriented to the ideal of justice de-
pends on the voluntary conversion in grace of those purporting to govern.
Where those who do so find themselves providentially to harbor the
requisite good will, they are, according to Augustine, able, notwithstand-
ing fallen circumstance, to know the minimal requisites of justice, as a
matter of natural law, through the light of a wisdom available to the mind,
in spite of sin, still made in the image of God.24 Yet, critically, Augustine
22. Yet whatever it loves, if only it is an assemblage of reasonable beings
and not of beasts, and is bound together by an agreement as to the ob-
jects of love. It is reasonably called a people; and it will be a superior
people in proportion as it is bound together by higher interests, inferior
in proportion as it is bound together by lower .... For, in general, the
city of the ungodly, which did not obey the command of God that it
should offer no sacrifice save to Him alone, and which, therefore, could
not give to the soul its proper command over the body, nor to the reason
its just authority over the vices, is void of true justice.
Id. at 706 (19:24).
23. Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robber-
ies? For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? The band
itself is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit
together by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law
agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to
such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of cities,
and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom,
because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal
of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity.
Id. at 112 (4:4).
24. But, as man has a rational soul, he subordinates all this which he has
in common with the beasts to the peace of his rational soul, that his intel-
lect may have free play and may regulate his actions, and that he may thus
enjoy the well-ordered harmony of knowledge and action which consti-
tutes, as we have said, the peace of the rational soul. And for this purpose
he must desire to be neither molested by pain, nor disturbed by desire,
nor extinguished by death, that he may arrive at some useful knowledge
by which he may regulate his life and manners. But, owing to the liability
of the human mind to fall into mistakes, this very pursuit of knowledge
may be a snare to him unless he has a divine Master, whom he may obey
without misgiving, and who may at the same time give him such help as to
preserve his own freedom. And because, so long as he is in this mortal
body, he is a stranger to God, he walks by faith, not by sight; and he
therefore refers all peace, bodily or spiritual or both, to that peace which
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remains skeptical about the fuller scope even of this knowledge. In his
view, the converted yield their wills to the well-ordered will of God that
wills a universal harmony that is to emerge at history's end, which can be
believed now, while not yet already seen by the created intellect. 25 Con-
version brings, then, not superadded insight into already knowable truth
regarding the ontology of social fulfillment, as in Thomas, but rather both
less and more. It permits less in that it opens no door to common knowl-
edge of shared ultimate ends. It permits more, in that it anchors human
reasoning about justice in an in-itself-unseen higher law of God's will, for-
mally guaranteeing the dignity and equality of all persons.26
The propensity of people to sin and the cumulative effect of sins over
time account for the full weight of pessimism in Augustine's moral episte-
mology. The civil resolution of disputes, for Augustine, is necessarily
piecemeal, for example, and occurs without any certainty of progress, i.e.,
adjudication occurs among people who, for the most part, are themselves
largely not motivated by a concern for justice in the true sense, and even
what it accomplishes by way of true justice amounts to but a thimbleful
against the backdrop of an ocean of the nearly infinite array of sins and
crimes occurring among the governed, yet remaining outside the scope of
mortal man has with the immortal God, so that he exhibits the well-or-
dered obedience of faith to eternal law.
Id. at 692 (19:14).
25. Since, then, the supreme good of the city of God is perfect and eter-
nal peace, not such as mortals pass into and out of by birth and death,
but the peace of freedom from all evil, in which the immortals ever abide;
who can deny that that future life is most blessed, or that, in comparison
with it, this life which now we live is most wretched, be it filled with all
blessings of body and soul and external things? And yet, if any man uses
this life with a reference to that other which he ardently loves and confi-
dently hopes for, he may well be called even now blessed, though not in
reality so much as in hope. But the actual possession of the happiness of
this life, without the hope of what is beyond, is but a false happiness and
profound misery. For the true blessings of the soul are not now enjoyed;
for that is no true wisdom which does not direct all its prudent observa-
tions, manly actions, virtuous self-restraint, and just arrangements, to that
end in which God shall be all and all in a secure eternity and perfect
peace.
Id. at 698 (19:20).
26. Peace between man and God is the well-ordered obedience of faith
to eternal law. Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord.
Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those of the family
who rule and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the
citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered and har-
monious enjoyment of God, and of one another in God. The peace of all
things is the tranquility of order. Order is the distribution which allots
things equal and unequal, each to its own place. And hence, though the
miserable, in so far as they are such, do certainly not enjoy peace, but are
severed from that tranquility of order in which there is no disturbance,
nevertheless, inasmuch as they are deservedly and justly, miserable, they
are by their very misery connected with order ....
Id. at 690 (19:13).
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governmental intervention. 27 No less, the minds of those governing them-
selves are prone to being blinded through the dazzle of power and inter-
ests, i.e., by reason of man's post-lapsarian inclination to override
knowledge of the intrinsic nature of things for the sake of the self-cen-
tered gratification of irascible and concupiscible impulses.
28
In the Augustinian view, governance by the State serves no more than
rough justice, and, logically, frequently depends upon pragmatic and pru-
dential judgments accommodating interests, rather than the realization of
27. Yet often, even in the present distribution of temporal things, does
God plainly evince His own interference. For if every sin were now visited
with manifest punishment, nothing would seem to be reserved for the
final judgment; on the other hand, if no sin received now a plainly divine
punishment, it would be concluded that there is no divine providence at
all. And so of the good things of this life: if God did not by a very visible
liberality confer these on some of those persons who ask for them, we
should say that these good things were not at His disposal; and if He gave
them to all who sought them, we should suppose that such were the only
rewards of His service; and such a service would make us not godly, but
greedy rather, and covetous. Wherefore, though good and bad men suf-
fer alike, we must not suppose that there is no difference between the
men themselves, because there is no difference in what they both suffer.
CONFESSIONS, supra note 19, at 132-33 (1:8).
28. What shall I say of these judgments which men pronounce on men,
and which are necessary in communities, whatever outward peace they
enjoy? Melancholy and lamentable judgments they are .... Thus the
ignorance of the judge frequently involves an innocent person in suffer-
ing .... For if he has chosen, in obedience to the philosophical instruc-
tions to the wise man, to quit this life rather than endure any longer such
tortures, he declares that he has committed the crime which in fact he
has not committed. And when he has been condemned and put to
death, the judge is still in ignorance whether he has put to death an inno-
cent or a guilty person.
If such darkness shrouds social life, will a wise judge take his seat on the
bench or no? Beyond question he will .... These numerous and impor-
tant evils he does not consider sins; for the wise judge does these things,
not with any intention of doing harm, but because his ignorance compels
him, and because human society claims him as a judge. But though we
therefore acquit the judge of malice, we must none the less condemn
human life as miserable. And if he is compelled to torture and punish
the innocent because his office and his ignorance constrain him, is he a
happy as well as a guiltless man? Surely it were proof of more profound
considerateness and finer feeling were he to recognize the misery of
these necessities, and shrink from his own implication in that misery; and
had he any piety about him, he would cry to God "From my necessities
deliver Thou me."
CITY OF GOD, supra note 17, at 681-83 (19:6).
But what is blame-worthy is, that they who themselves revolt from the
conduct of the wicked, and live in quite another fashion, yet spare those
faults in other men which they ought to reprehend and wean them from;
and spare them because they fear to give offence, lest they should injure
their interests in those things which good men may innocently and legiti-
mately use,-though they use them more greedily than becomes persons
who are strangers in this world, and profess the hope of a heavenly
country.
CONFESSIONS, supra note 19, at 134 (1:9).
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any clear principle. 29 The pursuit of temporal justice remains essentially
relative, historical and pragmatic. Within its mundane sphere, the State
gets along through peace-keeping solutions arrived at, found defective, al-
tered, revised, adopted and cast aside in the dialectic of political exchange
and experimentation. The interests at play in this dialectic remain, as far
as they go, at best amoral or pre-moral. A principle measure of the State's
success is, for Augustine, actually the extrinsic test of whether and how
well the State is able to provide sufficient pragmatic guarantees to allow
the Church to pursue its separate agenda.3
0
The common good, then, as measured not only by respect for justice
but by every basic moral value, remains, for Augustine, beyond the scope
of what political reason alone can hope fully to comprehend or effectuate.
Critically, in this view, where human capacity limits what can be expected
from the realm of human political endeavor, God's grace remains to sus-
tain the hope of unconditionally realizing justice and all other aspects of
the good, through a far larger and more invisible hand that Augustine
identifies with God's righteous and loving Providence. Augustine encour-
ages us to believe in this fulfillment, both, to a limited extent within his-
tory, and to an unlimited degree at an Eschaton disclosing a sovereign
God's transcendence of history itself in a final judgment working perfect
justice for all past acts that have evaded merely human justice. 31 Human
29. What shall I say of that virtue which is called prudence? Is not all its
vigilance spent in the discernment of good from evil things, so that no
mistake may be admitted about what we should desire and what avoid?
And thus it is itself a proof that we are in the midst of evils, or that evils
are in us; for it teaches us that it is an evil to consent to sin, and a good to
refuse this consent. And yet this evil, to which prudence teaches and tem-
perance enables us not to consent, is removed from this life neither by
prudence nor by temperance. And justice, whose office it is to render to
every man his due, whereby there is in man himself a certain just order of
nature, so that the soul is subjected to God, and the flesh to the soul, and
consequently both soul and flesh to God,-does not this virtue demon-
strate that it is as yet rather laboring towards its end than resting in its
finished work? ... Then that virtue which goes by the name of fortitude
is the plainest proof of the ills of life, for it is these ills which it is com-
pelled to bear patiently. And this holds good, no matter though the
ripest wisdom co-exists with it.
CITY OF GOD, supra note 17, at 678 (19:4).
30. Even the heavenly city, therefore, while in its state of pilgrimage,
avails itself of the peace of earth, and, so far as it can without injuring
faith and godliness, desires and maintains a common agreement among
men regarding the acquisition of the necessaries of life, and makes this
earthly peace bear upon the peace of heaven; for this alone can be truly
called and esteemed the peace of the reasonable creatures, consisting as
it does in the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and
of one another in God.
CONFESSIONS, supra note 19, at 393 (19:19).
31. For that day is properly called the day of judgment, because in it
there shall be no room left for the ignorant questioning why this wicked
person is happy and that righteous man unhappy. In that day true and
full happiness shall be the lot of none but the good, while deserved and
supreme misery shall be the portion of the wicked, and of them only.
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governance cannot attain to this more ultimate justice: for Augustine, "the
Apocalypse Is Coming, But Not Yet Here."
B. Plato, Also Pope Benedict's Precursor
In its longer pedigree, Pope Benedict's political vision derives
through Augustine from Plato. Augustine's relationship to Plato, as intel-
lectual forbearer, is, of course, complex. Augustine both appropriates
some basic assumptions of Platonic thought, and, at points, radically re-
places others with ones he finds elsewhere, in particular in Jewish and
Christian traditions, to forge his own original synthesis. As we will see,
Pope Benedict, in turn, likewise, both deploys Augustine's categories and
departs from them. Interestingly enough, where Pope Benedict departs
from Augustine, he does so, at times, actually to retrieve aspects of Plato
which Augustine abandoned. Understanding Plato on politics, thus, both
clarifies the salient and original qualities in Augustine on which Pope Ben-
edict builds, and identifies certain more original components in Platonism
Pope Benedict prefers to Augustine.
As Plato reveals in the Republic, he, no less than Augustine, held those
governing the well-ordered polity do so by coordinating the activity for
citizens and other residents who, themselves, for, the most part, incapable
of grasping the intrinsic requirements of reason. As in Augustine's, in
Plato's scheme governance consists in negotiating a tranquility of order by
the pragmatic management of the population.3 2 As the 'Analogy of the
CITY Or GOD, supra note 17, at 711 (20:1). Pope Benedict, as Joseph Cardinal Ratz-
inger, observed: "Augustine had regretfully admitted that eternity is not promised
to any political structure and that therefore even the Roman Empire could perish,
despite its positive achievement, despite its power and even despite its justice."
RATZINGER, A TURNING PoiNr, supra note 4, at 135.
32. And surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the
reverse of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or re-
vile one another in drink or out of in drink or, or who in any other man-
ner sin against themselves and their neighbors in word or deed, as the
manner of such is. Neither should they be trained to imitate the action
or speech of men or women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice,
is to be known but not to be practiced or imitated.
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 395 (bk. 3) (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1908).
And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den
and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate him-
self on the change, and pity them? Certainly, he would. And if they were
in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were
quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them
went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who
D [sic] were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do
you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the
possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer, Better to be the poor
servant of a poor master .... Men would say of him that up he went and
down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of
ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the
light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.
Id. at 516-17 (bk. 7).
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Cave' illustrates, Plato's guardian class, no less than Augustine's Christian
ruler, becomes equipped to govern through intellectual and moral conver-
sion, and it is, no less than is Augustine's ruler, committed to follow the
ideal of justice as North Star, although Plato's rulers know this moral di-
rection as an aspect of the idea of the good, rather than in relation to an
attitude of the Divine Will breaking into history.3
3
Intermediate concepts and conceptions specifying the idea of the
good, as it is can be realized in politics, largely exceeds the capacity of
human reason even of Plato's guardian class charged with discerning and
implementing its requirements. The guardians are to reach concrete
judgments about what is to be done through a painstaking process of disci-
pline and intuition unaided by the kinds of concepts describing real and
optimal forms of being in Aristotle and Aquinas. 34 The guardians must
contend also with the constant vying of appetites and interests in the pop-
ulace and themselves rising up in rebellion against reason. The pragmatic
response recommended by Plato includes rigorous control over the forma-
tion and upbringing of the guardians themselves and a practice of groom-
ing those governed to comply through the means of "noble lies." By virtue
of the grosser inadequacy of their reason, the subjects of the polity are, in
contrast to the guardians themselves, in fact, incapable of true moral
action. 3
5
33. And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlight-
ened or unenlightened:-[sic] Behold! Human [sic] beings living in a
underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reach-
ing all along the den; here they have been from their childhood ....
Until the person is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good,
and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to dis-
prove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never falter-
ing at any step of the argument-unless he can do all this, you would say
that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good ....
Id. at 533-34 (5:2).
34. And as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they
not be those who have most the character of guardians? Yes. And to this
end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special care of the
State? True. And a man will be most likely to care about that which he
loves? To be sure. And he will be most likely to love that which he re-
gards as having the same interests with himself, and that of which the
good or evil fortune is supposed by him at any time most to affect his
own? Very true, he replied. Then there must be a selection. Let us note
among the guardians those who in their whole life show the greatest ea-
gerness to do what is for the good of their country, and the greatest re-
pugnance to do what is against her interests. Those are the right men.
Yes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant. Therefore,
as 1 was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best guardians of
their own conviction that what they think the interest of the State is to be
the rule of their lives. We must watch them from their youth upwards,
and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or
to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be se-
lected, and he who falls in the trial is to be rejected.
Id. at 411-12 (bk. 3).
35. Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of
the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with
enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public
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Thus, Plato, like Augustine, espouses the notion that governance per-
ilously attains to the rule of reason only through a struggle of an elite or
privileged viewpoint asserting itself against the counterweight of unreason
in the majority of the law's subjects. The polity in Plato arrives atjustice by
achieving a societal equilibrium in which all its members contribute, col-
lectively, to the universal fulfillment of a hierarchy of basic needs, within
organic social structures, corresponding to a natural pattern of their con-
tributions and abilities. In most part, Plato's participants acquiesce in the
extrinsic direction of others, without directly knowing, by their own cogni-
tion, the principles actually governing rational action.3 6 Up to a certain
point, a parallel can surely be drawn to "the tranquility of order" that the
Augustinian state seeks to attain. Where actualized, the ideal polity fulfills,
in Plato, the mind's yearning to return to an original state of affairs before
reason's fall into conditions of the material world. This return is akin,
without doubt, in its own way, to the fulfillment St. Augustine envisions for
the human will in a state of rest in the will of God, the temporal tranquility
of order the State fosters, in St. Augustine anticipating, in its own provi-
sional way, a parallel outcome.
37
good .... How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of
which we lately spoke-just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if
that be possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?
Id. at 414 (bk. 3).
36. Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember
the original principle which we were always laying down at the founda-
tion of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing
to which his nature was best adapted;- [sic] now justice is this principle
or a part of it. Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.
Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not
being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said
the same to us. Yes, we said so. Then to do one's own business in a
certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I de-
rive this inference? I cannot, but I should like to be told. Because I think
that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other
virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that
this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them,
and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying
that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or
remaining one. That follows of necessity. If we are asked to determine
which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excel-
lence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the
preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about
the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or
whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in chil-
dren and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject,-[sic] the
quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not being a busy-
body, would claim the palm-the question is not so easily answered.
Id. at 432-33.
37. "Thou movest us to delight in praising Thee; for Thou hast formed us for
Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee?" CONFESSIONS, supra
note 19, at 1. Plato holds that
Then what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in his followers? One
only, expressed once for all in the old saying that "like agrees with like,
with measure measure," but things which have no measure agree neither
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Where the polity, in Plato, fails the measure ofjustice, it degenerates,
by stages, into the tyranny of rule by a solitary moral monster whose law-
lessness undermines and frustrates all genuine social bonds.38 For Plato, a
society's departure from justice and descent into tyranny occurs in steps as
the society abandons, by degrees, sociability. 39 As structures of govern-
ance gradually lose their orientation to the norm of justice, they take on,
in Plato, as in St. Augustine, a criminal character. In this, we see again
that the deep structure of much of Augustine's thought derives from Pla-
tonic political philosophy.
Yet, these numerous parallels should not distract from the inventory
that promptly may be drawn up of the significant revisions Augustine
makes to Plato. A summary of these might be summarized with Augus-
tine's implicit rejoinder to innerworldly perfectionism, "The Apocalypse is
to come, but is not yet Here!" Foremost among Augustine's revisions to
Plato is his well-known substitution of the living, personal and transcen-
dent God of Hebrew and Christian Scripture, for the "idea of the good," in
Plato, immanent within human reason. 40 Plato, with his reverence for the
divine at the source of being, had no particular appreciation for God as
the lord of history or the dialectic of human and divine freedom within
with themselves nor with the things which have. Now God ought to be to
us the measure of all things, and not man, as men commonly say (Protag-
oras): the words are far more true of him. And he who would be dear to
God must, as far as is possible, be like him and such as he is. Wherefore
the temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like him; and the intem-
perate man is unlike him, and different from him, and unjust.
6 BENJAMIN JOWETr, THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 99 (1892).
38. And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at
his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by
the favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and
murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy
tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizen; some he kills and
others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and
partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not
either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a
wolf-that is, a tyrant?
PLATO, supra note 32, at 565 (bk. 8).
39. The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to
pass into excess of slavery. Yes, the natural order. And so tyranny natu-
rally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny
andslavery out of the most extreme form of liberty? As we might expect.
That, however, was not, as I believe, your question-you rather desired to
know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and de-
mocracy, and is the ruin of both?
PLATO, supra note 32, at 551 (bk. 8).
40. If, then, we be asked what the city of God has to say upon these
points, and, in the first place, what its opinion regarding the supreme
good and evil is, it will reply that life eternal is the supreme good, death
eternal the supreme evil, and that to obtain the one and escape the other
we must live rightly. And thus it is written, "The just lives by faith," for we
do not as yet see our good, and must therefore live by faith; neither have
we in ourselves power to live rightly, but can do so only if He who has
given us faith to believe in His help do help us when we believe and pray.
CITY OF GOD, supra note 17, at 676 (19:4).
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history. Augustine, thus, re-characterizes the unwisdom of those, in Plato's
scheme, who do not respond to reason, by means of a concept of sin un-
derstood as rebellion against a Divine Lawgiver.4 1 He rejects Plato's no-
tion of ultimate rest for the soul in the life of the polity, as its ultimate
good, advancing, in its stead, a concept of the purely temporal goal of the
secular, merely relative, and largely instrumental good of respite from anx-
iety.42 Notwithstanding elements of pessimism in his thought, Plato be-
lieved that human beings can attain to the definitive human good in time,
if not by anticipation of an eschatological ideal, then, by return to a pri-
mordial state of original goodness. Augustine counters with a novel dual-
ism that asserts that the realization of political ideals, within history, can
give rise only to the provisionally good.
In his contrastingly monistic view, Plato holds that the realization of
the political ideal gives rise to a universal social bond based on the approx-
imation to true virtue in those governed. In his dualistic vision, Augustine
assumes rather that the virtuous and vicious alike share instrumentalism as
a common mode of merely temporal rationality. He assumes further that
interior virtues and vices concern society, only insofar as they add to or
assuage fear of material loss. Augustine, likewise, declines to follow Plato
in the ascription of virtue merely to conformity to social caste and the
organic perfection of society. He asserts, instead, the strict moral equality
of all persons, equal in their accountability before the historically inbreak-
ing transcendent bar of Divine Justice definitively awaited at the Es-
chaton.4 3 Although Augustine's polity, like Plato's, governs itself through
41. In Scripture they are called God's enemies who oppose His rule, not
by nature, but by vice; having no power to hurt Him, but only themselves.
For they are His enemies, not through their power to hurt, but by their
will to oppose Him. For God is unchangeable, and wholly proof against
injury. Therefore the vice which makes those who are called His enemies
resist Him, is an evil not to God, but to themselves.
CONFESSIONS, supra note 19, at 83 (12:3).
42. Thus the things necessary for this mortal life are used by both kinds
of men and families alike, but each has its own peculiar and widely differ-
ent aim in using them. The earthly city, which does not live by faith,
seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered con-
cord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men's wills to
attain the things which are helpful to this life.
CITY OF GOD, supra note 17, at 695 (19:17). Plato links the just order of the city
with the only inner peace available to human beings:
And the division of labour which required the carpenter and the shoe-
maker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and
not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use?
Clearly. But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being con-
cerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is
the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit
the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of
them to do the work of others,-[sic] he sets in order his own inner life,
and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself.
PLATO, supra note 32, at 443 (bk. 4).
43. But as our present concern is with those Christians who were taken
prisoners, let those who take occasion from this calamity to revile our
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an "elite," Augustine rejects Plato's hierarchy of relative capacities for
moral agency. All men are equally capable of moral choice in Augustine.
Those who fall from grace in his scheme are of equal dignity, excluded not
by caste but only by their misuse of freedom.
Through these key alterations, Augustine shifL Plato's balance of pes-
simism and optimism on the perfectibility through politics, of human na-
ture. This shift occurs simultaneously in two opposing directions. In one
direction, Augustine's pessimism becomes more profound than Plato's,
flattening and limiting, as Augustine does, the conferral by the telos ofjus-
tice of its finality on the State. In contrast to Plato, Augustine qualifies this
telos as no more than guaranteeing the stability of merely temporal or ex-
trinsic order. His citizens or residents, achieving only interim calm and
order by operation of the State, are left to seek their own ultimate fulfill-
ment in virtue on an altogether different plane. Augustine holds all
merely natural or organic indicia of collective happiness, which Plato envi-
sions as contributing to ultimate human fulfillment as, far from occasions
for realizing any idea of the good, to be, in fact, no more than "splendid
vices" or masks for libido dominandi, a universal human inclination to sin by
preferring self to the universal good. 44 Plato's Republic would, without the
revision Augustine supplies orienting it to the God of Abraham, Isaac and
Jacob, necessarily become, for Augustine, the fallen civitas terrana,45 and
most wholesome religion in a fashion not less imprudent than impudent,
consider this and hold their peace; for if it was no reproach to their gods
that a most punctilious worshipper of theirs should, for the sake of keep-
ing his oath to them, be deprived of his native land without hope of find-
ing another, and fall into the hands of his enemies, and be put to death
by a long-drawn and exquisite torture, much less ought the Christian
name to be charged with the captivity of those who believe in its power,
since they, in confident expectation of a heavenly country, know that they
are pilgrims even in their own homes.
CrrY OF GOD, supra note 17, at 21 (1:15).
44. And therefore the wise men of the one city, living according to man,
have sought for profit to their own bodies or souls, or both, and those
who have known God "glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful,
but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was dark-
ened; professing themselves to be wise,"-[sic] that is, glorying in their
own wisdom, and being possessed by pride,-"they became fools, and
changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to
corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping
things." For they were either leaders or followers of the people in ador-
ing images, "and worshipped and served the creature more than the Cre-
ator, who is blessed for ever."
Id. at 477 (14:28).
45. But the earthly city, which shall not be everlasting (for it will no
longer be a city when it has been committed to the extreme penalty), has
its good in this world, and rejoices in it with such joy as such things can
afford .... For each part of it that arms against another part of it seeks to
triumph over the nations through itself in bondage to vice. If, when it
has conquered, it is inflated with pride, its victory is life-destroying; but if
it turns its thoughts upon the common casualties of our mortal condition,
and is rather anxious concerning the disasters that may befall it than
elated with the successes already achieved, this victory, though of a higher
kind, is still only short-lived; for it cannot abidingly rule over those whom
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Plato's guardians, themselves, in truth, no better than "a band of robbers."
Augustine concedes an autonomous ground of moral authority to the
State, but he does so, in a manner, thus relativizing that authority and
limiting its scope.
In a converse direction, Augustine introduces radically greater opti-
mism into his view of the State, by introducing a radically steeper gradient
than does Plato in the angle of ascent he proposes to the ideal. Augustine
grounds the norm of justice he incorporates into his vision of the end of
the State in the belief of a transcendent, radically free, personal and loving
God. Under this norm, every human person is accorded radical equality,
without regard to his or her temporal power, ability or importance. 46 Au-
gustine conceives of this Divine Ground as deriving from revelation of a
God, who, although uncreated and eternal, is also the type each human
being considered, him or herself to be imago dei, a morally inviolable end
Zn se.
Where Plato envisions the just resolution of disputes as occurring mo-
nistically in an imminent order through the reinforcement of a lattice of
organically determined social niches, d la Plessy v. Ferguson,47 Augustine's
dualism places it in a prolepsis of the Last Judgment, that is, as, in princi-
ple, founded on unconditioned respect for each human being's transcen-
dence as end-in-him or herself, without regard to intrinsic merit of social
standing. For Augustine, the facts of each case ideally are discerned by
sifting of evidence, and evaluated in relation to the intrinsic dignity of the
it has victoriously subjugated.... These things, then, are good things,
and without doubt the gifts of God. But if they neglect the better things
of the heavenly city, which are secured by eternal victory and peace never-
ending, and so inordinately covet these present good things that they be-
lieve them to be the only desirable things, or love them better than those
things which are believed to be better,-[sic] if this be so, then it is neces-
sary that misery follow and ever increase.
Id. at 481-82 (15:4).
46. Pope Benedict, as Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, noted that:
It would be fascinating to examine the synthesis in which Augustine,....
when all the signs threatened a coming destruction, blended the Platonic
and the Roman (linear) tradition on the basis of the new elements of the
Christian faith. By uniting cyclical and linear, ascending and descending
considerations of history, he corrected their one-sidedness and thus cre-
ated the intellectual foundations on which Europe could be built.
RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra note 4, at 134-35.
47. The Court in Plessy held that:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinc-
tions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only
result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil
and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the
other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the
constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Ed.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Ratzinger views as "Plato's great achievement [ ] to remove
this scheme of three states from the geographical subdivision and to link it instead
with the three fundamental modes of human existence, thus uniting politics to
anthropology." RATZINGER, A TURNING PoIr, supra note 4, at 130.
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person, and not vice versa. Were its social structures deprived of the
mooring supplied an orientation of the will of the ruler to justice as funda-
mental norm, the polity, for Augustine, could retain all of its social cohe-
sion, so important to Plato, but yet degenerate, thereby, into affirmative
injustice, becoming an association oriented, in effect, to mutual greed and
lust for power.
The social bond, where it continues to exist, remains ipsofacto, always
for Plato, an expression of the moral health of society. By contrast, even
this bond becomes, for St. Augustine, itself corrupt, where it is deprived of
grace and, through grace, self-transcendence. Augustine makes respect
for the dignity of the individual person, imago dei, the measure of justice.
Plato makes that test the individual's conformity to a social niche imposed
by the needs of the many. The ultimate exemplar of injustice, for Plato, is
the tyrant, the completely desocialized individual. 48 For Augustine, this
exemplar is found in the compact of mutual self-interest once deprived of
respect for the person imago dei. Augustine has in common with Plato, the
subordination of the State to the fundamental norm of justice. Unlike
Plato, Augustine rejects the organic social bond as that norm's intrinsic
measure, substituting for it, the transcendent dignity of the person.
When this article turns to Pope Benedict's political philosophy
shortly, the reader will have an opportunity to see that the Pope writes in
continuity with Augustine, adopting his pattern of relative optimism and
pessimism over and against Plato, modeling, for example, Augustinian
skepticism about the capacity of the State to realize any intrinsic organic
perfection of social hierarchy, but also Augustinian optimism about the
intrinsic equality of the human person.
The reader will, however, also have the opportunity to see that, as he
signals in his controversial Regensberg Address, Pope Benedict, in a cer-
tain respect, turns back from the austerity of Augustinian pessimism, si-
multaneously to align himself with Plato.4 9 An instance of Augustine's
48. Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son
which has already happened to the father;-[sic]he is drawn into a per-
fectly lawless life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his
father and friends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite
party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrant-
makers find that they are losing their hold on him, they contrive to im-
plant in him a master passion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift
lusts-a sort of monstrous winged drone-that is the only image which
will adequately describe him.... Yes, he said, that is the way in which the
tyrannical man is generated. And is not this the reason why of old love
has been called a tyrant? I should not wonder.
PLATO, supra note 32, at 572-73 (bk. 9). Ratzinger does not necessarily concur in
this distinction, referring to Augustine's interpretation as the "definitive interpre-
tation of the Platonic tradition." RATZINGER, A TURNING PoINT, supra note 4, at
132.
49. Rejecting the notion that a de-Hellenization of Christianity is possible in
keeping with Christianity's nature, Pope Benedict stated,
[t] his inner rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek philosophi-
cal inquiry was an event of decisive importance not only from the stand-
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relative pessimism in contrast to Plato is the Augustinian assumption that a
general depravity of will makes it impossible for society to proceed beyond
maintaining civil peace, to any projection of common societal programs
for the true fulfillment of all. While arduous and necessarily hierarchical,
Plato alleges, by contrast, that such programs are possible. On this ques-
tion of feasibility of social programs, Pope Benedict agrees with Plato. Key
to Pope Benedict's political philosophy is the adjustment of core Augustin-
ian assumptions to permit an endorsement of the possibility of knowing
and serving an imminent political realization of the good of human
welfare.
C. A Second Departure from Augustianism: Pope Benedict's Dialectic of
Compromise with German Idealism
A considerable cultural divide undeniably separates the world of con-
temporary Western political institutions giving Pope Benedict his context,
from the categories of classical antiquity. Knowledge of late eighteenth-
century and nineteenth century idealist philosophy of Pope Benedict's
own native Germany is indispensable in understanding, more specifically,
how the Pope mediates this divide even as he appropriates concepts from
Augustine and Plato. With certain critical variations, philosophers such as
Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel all
recapitulate certain fundamental outlines of Augustine's and, less directly,
of Plato's political ideas. They do so in a new key provided through their
alternate metaphysics of mind or history.
Pope Benedict fashions a political philosophy that is plausible to con-
temporary readers precisely through a dialectic of critique and acceptance
of various elements in the idealism of modernity. A brief review of the
content of these modern philosophies will serve to prepare the reader to
understand more precisely where Pope Benedict incorporates elements
from German Idealism, even as he rejects others as the pathogenic source
of the wrong turn of the Age of Social Revolution.
1. Kant
The political and legal theory of Immanuel Kant, the founder of Ger-
man Idealism, more than dimly, evokes Augustine's "two cities" in its bifur-
cation of the universe of human choice and action into dual parallel
realms of morality and law.5 0 Kant's bifurcation parallels Augustine's sep-
point of the history of religions, but also from that of world history-it is
an event which concerns us even today. Given this convergence, it is not
surprising that Christianity, despite its origins and some significant devel-
opments in the East, finally took on its historically decisive character in
Europe.
ADDRESS AT REGENSBURG, supra note 13.
50. The universal law of right may then be expressed thus: "Act externally in
such a manner that the free exercise of thy will may be able to coexist with the
freedom of all others, according to a universal law." Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of
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arate spheres in which divine justice specifies the scope of the "heavenly,"
and self-interest that of the temporal sphere. Kant, for his part, defines
the realm of morality through the scope belonging inherently to princi-
ples of autonomy and integrity. This sphere corresponds, in its own way,
to Augustine's "heavenly" realm,5 1 but substitutes a secular for Augustine's
theological principle. Kant defines the scope of the opposing realm in his
schema, i.e., the realm of law, by the principle of the fittingness of coer-
cion as a device equalizing human freedom as a condition of social life
among beings who are ends-in-themselves. 52 This latter principle parallels
Augustine's principle of coercion under law as the appropriate response
to objectively unjust material incursions on the part of sinful self-interest
by which he defines due order in the temporal sphere.
Kant's dualism, in contrast to Augustine's, but once again like Plato's,
on the level of social order, resolves into a monistic whole. True, parallel
to the dialectical schema of Augustine, Kant's principle of the upright will,
which organizes the sphere of morality, carries over to make imperative
the application of coercion in the sphere of law (in keeping with a secular-
izing tendency in Kant, Augustine's theologized notion of justice before
God is here replaced with the anthropocentric notion of the obligation
discerned by moral agent upon encountering human society, requiring
him or her to join in a social contract under a rule of law).53 And, con-
versely, the encounter of material conflict with others within the sphere of
law provides, for Kant, the decisive test of the internal integrity of will
within the moral agent. Nonetheless, in Kant, as opposed to in Augustine,
the order of law in the temporal sphere, far from being provisional and
partial is, in principle, perfectly and finally the instantiation of a kingdom
of beings who are ends-in-themselves. Just as Plato envisions substantive
Morals, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 131, 133 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1970) (1797) [hereinafter Kant, Metaphysics of Morals]. On the
other hand:
Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold. The
autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of all
duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy of the
elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on the
contrary, opposed to the principle thereof and to the morality of the will.
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., Barnes &
Nobel 2004) [hereinafter KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON].
51. See ADDRESS AT REGENSBURG, supra note 13 (defining realm of morality).
52. See id.
53. Thus the first decision the individual is obligated to make, if he does
not wish to renounce all concepts of right, will be to adopt the principle
that one must abandon the state of nature in which everyone follows his
own desires, and unite with everyone else (with whom he cannot avoid
having intercourse) in order to submit to external, public and lawful co-
ercion. He must accordingly enter into a state wherein that which is to be
recognized as belonging to each person is allotted to him by law and guar-
anteed to him by an adequate power (which is not his own but external
to him). In other words, he should at all costs enter into a state of civil
society.
Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 50, at 137.
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perfection in organic social structures, Kant, thus, envisions formal perfec-
tion in a rule of right ordering of freedom.
Society's substantive good, for its part, remains decidedly more
opaque for Kant than it was for Augustine. Augustine, in contrast to his
precursor Plato, had, as was noted above, already moved in the direction
of a relative decapacitation of the State to pursue the good. In keeping
with his altered metaphysics, Kant takes another long step beyond Augus-
tine in this direction. For Kant, society does not lose its capacity to know
and realize, in common, an intrinsic "good," through sin which is a theo-
logical fact, as in Augustine. Rather, it already lacks this capacity at the
outset because the limits of reason themselves ensure that individual
human ends can never be known to be anything more than an Agfega-
tion of private interests, competing endlessly for attention.
When this article turns, at last, to its exposition of the specifics of
Pope Benedict's tilt away from purely Augustinian assumptions to effectu-
ate a certain retrieval of Plato, the reader will have occasion to observe
that Pope Benedict mediates that step, by reliance on something like this
reconstruction by Kant of Augustine's temporal sphere, in terms of mor-
ally neutral autonomous choice and individual interest, thereby sidestep-
ping Plato's idealization of an organic perfection of social hierarchy.
The parallels that unite Kant and Augustine are subject to other key
qualifications which, by contrast, however, also point to divergences be-
tween Kant and Benedict. Kant, for instance, restricts the human capacity
even indirectly to infer the existence of God. Pursuant to their conception
of knowledge opposing subject and object, Kant, and, no less, later Ger-
man idealists, decline to endorse the medieval scholastic metaphysics in-
fluenced by Aristotle. Kant and these subsequent thinkers were led by
their rejection of realist metaphysics to deny the role in moral knowledge
ascribed to divine transcendence even by the neo-Platonic Augustine.
Kant and his heirs believe that one cannot know even inferentially from
the Creation, the Creator,54 while one, by contrast, can know the ideas of
the mind or, in the vision of later idealists, history.55 Obviously enough,
Pope Benedict remains deeply wedded to the Augustinian vision on this
point.
54. Kant argues that both the cosmological and physico-theological proofs of
God's existence fail. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PuRE REASON, supra note 50, at 288-89,
307; see also, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO GERMAN IDEALISM (Karl Ameriks ed.
2000); REVELATION AS HISTORY (Wolfhart Pannenberg ed., David Granskou trans.,
1968).
55. According to this abstract definition it may be said of Universal His-
tory, that it is the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the
knowledge of that which it is potentially. And as the germ bears in itself
the whole nature of the tree, and the taste and form of its fruits, so do the
first traces of Spirit virtually contain the whole of that History.
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 17-18 (J. Sibree
M.A. trans., Wiley Book Co. 1944). See generally PETER C. HODGSON, GOD IN HIS-
TORY (Abingdon Press 1989).
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Kant, who, by contrast to Augustine, considers the world opaque to
the human desire to know the good by reason of intrinsic limits in the
human capacity to know, rather than as an effect of sin, 5 6 responded to
Utilitarianism, that it is simply not possible to know what is good in earthly
states of affairs. 57 He, correspondingly, requires the State to withdraw out-
right from the quest of the social good, limiting it to enforcing the formal
requirements of a refereed laissez-faire, that is to a role of "Night Watch-
man State."
58
Augustine does not, for his part, go entirely so far as to hold that the
sinful alienation of human beings from God makes the world utterly
opaque to discernment of the good. He holds, rather, that the knowledge
is possible of at least the material and temporal aspect of the good. This
knowledge of the good albeit limited still intelligibly connects the Crea-
tion and the Creator who is at its source. Augustine, thus, considers the
State as realizing an external state of affairs that has an at least an objec-
tively pragmatic value in relation to the human good.
Where Augustine does hold that the darkened character of the
human intellect ineluctably bars the State from advancing any more ulti-
mate vision of human welfare, a key difference arises with Kant. Augustine
offers solace of the "invisible hand" of Divine Providence at work, to some
extent, even within history itself, and, more ultimately, awaiting revelation
56. From this it can also be seen that if one asks about God's final end in
creating the world, one must not name the happiness of the rational be-
ings in it but ... the condition of being worthy of happiness .... For,
since wisdom considered theoretically signifies the knowledge of the sum-
mum bonum ... one cannot attribute to a highest independent wisdom
an end based merely on beneficence. For one cannot conceive the effect
of this beneficence (with respect to the happiness of rational beings) as
befitting the highest original good except under the limiting conditions
of harmony with the holiness of his will.
KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, 109 (5:131) (Mary Gregor trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Series 1997).
57. [W]oe betide anyone who winds his way through the labyrinth of the
theory of happiness in search of some possible advantage to be gained by
releasing the criminal from his punishment or from any part of it, or who
acts in the spirit of the pharisaical saying: 'It is better that one man
should die than that the whole people should go to ruin.' For if justice
perishes, there is no further point in men living on earth.
Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 50, at 155. "The proverbial saying fiat iusti-
tia, pereat mundus (i.e., let justice reign, even if all the rogues in the world must
perish) may sound somewhat inflated, but it is nonetheless true. It is a sound
principle of right, which blocks up all the devious paths followed by cunning or
violence." IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS 93, 123 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1970).
58. "The Law of Right, as thus enunciated, is represented as a reciprocal
Compulsion necessarily in accordance with the Freedom of every one, under the
principle of a universal Freedom." IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: AN
EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF
RicHT 48 (W. Hastie trans., T & T Clark 1887). But see generally ROBERT NozIcK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Basic Books, Inc. 1974).
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at the Eschaton through God's Sovereign Act beyond history, righting
every wrong and fulfilling every honest hope, i.e., in the awaited Apoca-
lypse which Is Not Now.
While Kant offers an analogue to the solace Augustine finds in Divine
Providence, he does so, critically, in a secularizing direction. Kant's al-
tered metaphysics places this analogue to providence, within a "lowered"
horizon found inside, rather than beyond history. Kant's "invisible hand,"
moreover, vindicated not that of justice, which, after all, can never be
more adequately realized for Kant, than within the moral agent's own up-
right will, but rather in an experience of the good of happiness that can be
sought and experienced but not objectively known. This future fulfill-
ment within history is effectuated, not by God, as in Augustine, but by
"nature," more specitically, by the "nature of human freedom" when that
freedom receives the imprint of universal coordination under law accord-
ing to the norm of fairness.5 9
Kant, of course, denies that we can anticipate, know, or control this
vindication of the good, just as Augustine denies that we can do so in
anticipation of Divine Providence. Still, Kant takes the essential step,
counter to Augustine, of asserting that "the Apocalypse Is Now." For, he
asserts as a kind of postulate of practical reason that the "New Creation" of
59. The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the
realisation [sic] of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally-
and for this purpose also externally-perfect political constitution as the
only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be
developed completely.
IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in POLITICAL
WRITINGs 41, 50 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1970).
I may thus be permitted to assume that, since the human race is con-
stantly progressing in cultural maters (in keeping with its natural pur-
pose), it is also engaged in progressive improvement in relation to the
moral end of its existence. This progress may at times be interrupted but
never broken off I do not need to prove this assumption; it is up to the
adversary to prove his case. I am a member of a series of human genera-
tions, and as such, I am not as good as I ought to be or could be accord-
ing to the moral requirements of my nature. I base my argument upon
my inborn duty of influencing posterity in such a way that it will make
constant progress (and I must thus assume that progress is possible), and
that this duty may be rightfully handed down from one member of the
series to the next. History may give rise to endless doubts about my
hopes, and if these doubts could be proved, they might persuade me to
desist from an apparently futile task. But so long as they do not have the
force of certainty, I cannot exchange my duty.., for a rule of expediency
which says that I ought not to attempt the impracticable .... And how-
ever uncertain I may be and may remain as to whether we can hope for
anything better for mankind, this uncertainty cannot detract from the
maxim I have adopted, or from the necessity of assuming for practical
purposes that human progress is possible .... This, however, calls for
unselfish goodwill ....
IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not
Apply in Practice, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 88-89 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1970).
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definitive and final progress towards the good of ultimate human happi-
ness is sure to occur within history by some immanent mechanism. This
progress does not reflect Divine Providence and does not link us to our
Creator. It is at this first emergence of the idea in Kant, that German
idealism and the Marxism following upon it, veer definitively into a set of
assumptions at odds with an account of practical and political reason that
Pope Benedict attributes with causing the errors of the Age here termed,
the Age of Social Revolution.
2. Post-Kantian Idealism, and the Definitive Wrong Turn of German Idealism
Kant's idealist successor Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling contin-
ued Kant's dialectic of subject and object. But, unlike Kant, Schelling
abandoned a framework of dual realms, considering such dualism tran-
scended in the reconciliation of opposites arising through dynamic unity
of art and history. Based on this unity, Schelling is able to propose a meta-
physics less austere than Kant's. In contrast to his implicit appropriation
of elements from Kant, Pope Benedict evinces no interest in Schelling's
metaphysics. Pope Benedict would be even more prepared, than is the
case of Kant, to fault Schelling for asserting an imminent eschatology.
Schelling imagines, for example, that, within the progress of history, one
encounters and, indeed, can know ideas and ideals of ultimate human
fulfillment that ought to come to structure common life.60 The ideas in
myth, rather than reflecting institutions already given within culture, in
Schelling's view, actually, give rise to such institutions, the nation or polity,
for example, and is their cause.6 1 The universal progress in history, which
60. But now so far as the transcendental necessity of history is concerned,
it has already been deduced in the foregoing from the fact that the uni-
versal reign of law has been set before rational beings as a problem, real-
izable only by the species as a whole, that is, only by way of history. We
content ourselves here, therefore, with merely drawing the conclusion,
that the sole true object of the historian can only be the gradual emer-
gence of a political world order, for this, indeed, is the sole ground for a
history.... That the concept of history embodies the notion of an infi-
nite tendency to progress, has been sufficiently shown above.
F.W.J. SCHELLING, SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALisM 202 (Peter Heath trans.,
Univ. Press of Va. 1978) (1800).
61. The work of art reflects to us the identity of the conscious and un-
conscious activities. But the opposition between them is an infinite one,
and its removal is effected without any assistance from freedom. Hence
the basic character of the work of art is that of an unconscious infinity [syn-
thesis of nature and freedom]. Besides what he has put into the work
with manifest intention, the artist seems instinctively as it were, to have
depicted therein an infinity, which no finite understanding is capable of
developing to the full. To explain what we mean by a single example: the
mythology of the Greeks, which undeniably contains an infinite meaning
and a symbolism for all ideas, arose among a people, and in a fashion,
which both make it impossible to suppose any comprehensive fore-
thought in devising it, or in the harmony whereby everything is united
into one great whole. So it is with every true work of art, in that every one
of them is capable of being expounded ad infinitum, as though it con-
tained an infinity of purposes, while yet one is never able to say whether
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Kant envisions as necessary but in itself unknowable, Schelling suggests
can be known through concepts of the good to be accomplished, knowa-
ble through developments within the history of ideas. Concepts for ena-
bling and then evaluating the realization of this good can be intuited from
history. This knowledge of the fulfillment of the good within history
manifests what the reader will eventually have the opportunity here to rec-
ognize as what Pope Benedict would term the modern fallacy of immanent
necessary historical progress.
Upon arriving at the full maturity of German Idealism in G.W.F.
Hegel, one finds a full-blown philosophy elaborating a structure of reason-
ing regarding successive stages in the realization of ideals that unfolds in a
dialectical pattern of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. 62 In the Hegelian
view, the State itself, when it emerges within history, appears as the realiza-
tion in time of the ideal of justice: in the end, in the manifestation of the
state of the fulfillment of what is right. Hegel offers what purports to be a
scientific analysis of what the realization of the ideal calls for, in all detail,
and of how human beings, in material steps, can definitively and scientifi-
cally foster and advance it.63 Like Schelling's, Hegel's system is not of
interest to Pope Benedict, and, even more than Schelling's, embodies the
fallacy Pope Benedict's Christian account of practical reason rejects.
With certain adjustments, Hegel's philosophy ultimately provides
Hegel's left-wing successor Marx the concepts he needs to formulate his
program of so-called dialectical materialism. 64 Ultimately, it is Marxism
this infinity has lain within the artist himself, or resides only in the work
of art.
Id. at 225.
62. The connection of events above indicated, involves also the fact, that
in history an additional result is commonly produced by human actions
beyond that which they aim at and obtain-that which they immediately
recognize and desire. They gratify their own interest; but something fur-
ther is thereby accomplished, latent in the actions in question, though
not present in their consciousness, and not included in their design....
The purport of their desires is interwoven with general, essential considera-
tions ofjustice, good, duty, etc ..... It is quite otherwise with the com-
prehensive relations that History has to do with. In this sphere are
presented those momentous collisions between existing, acknowledged
duties, laws, and rights, and those contingencies which are adverse to this
fixed system; which assail and even destroy its foundations and existence;
whose tenor may nevertheless seem good-on the large scale advanta-
geous-yes, even indispensable and necessary.... This principle is an
essential phase in the development of the creating Idea of Truth striving
and urging towards [consciousness of] itself. Historical men-World-His-
torical Individuals--are those in whose aim such a general principle lies.
HEGEL, supra note 55, at 27-29.
63. Hegel purports to find a detailed basis for formulating mid-nineteenth
century marriage and family law and the law of business corporations from the
necessity of historical dialectic. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT 111-17, 152-55 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1942).
64. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."
KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGLES, CAPITAL, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO AND OTHER
WRrrINGS 321 (Max Eastman ed., The Modem Library 1959) (1841).
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that attracts Pope Benedict's most negative assessment in his encyclical,
Deus caritas est.65 Pope Benedict is skeptical of Marxism's claims for a sci-
entific theory of the meaning of history. But, it is the concrete and practi-
cal experience of human misery and want on a global scale caused by
historic Marxist political systems that leads the Pope to denounce the pat-
tern of increasingly broad fallacious assertions within evolving forms of
German idealism. Even as the Pope rejects Idealist immanence, however,
it is not to be overlooked that Pope Benedict simultaneously borrows from
its initial instantiation in Kant, an understanding of morally neutral indi-
vidual interests as a basis of moral agency, to fashion his own contempo-
rary updated revision of Augustine. 6 6
D. Pope Benedict's Political Philosophy
In Deus caritas est, Pope Benedict succinctly but quite comprehensively
sketches a political philosophy in support of his vision of Church and
State. This philosophy is demonstrably Augustinian in its fundamental
outlines, and yet consciously departs from Augustine on key points relat-
ing to the endorsement of a common program of societal fulfillment, rely-
ing on these points, as will be seen below, on elements in Plato and Kant.
1. Pope Benedict's Basic Profile is Augustinian
That the fundamental outlines of Pope Benedict's political philoso-
phy are Augustinian comports with Pope Benedict's assertion, in the en-
cyclical, that the central normative principle of politics, for example, is
justice. He states that "the pursuit ofjustice must be a fundamental norm
of the State"67 and that the "central responsibility of politics" is the organi-
zation of the polity, "governed according to justice" and "the just ordering
of society and the State."68 The Augustinian slant of the Pope's vision of
justice appears more clearly when Benedict states that he simultaneously
regards politics as, intrinsically, channeling "power and special interests,"
the "dazzling effect"69 of which can be to blind practical reason, with the
65. For the idea that one could by entering into the laws of history, ulti-
mately construct something like earthly paradise as the product of all
paths and detours is inimical to freedom and is therefore inhuman. It
presupposes that history will one day no longer be based on freedom but
on definitive structures. The double paradox of this expectation consists
in the fact that one does not wish to free man for freedom but from his
freedom; that one wishes to achieve the absolute-the definitive society-
precisely by excluding the absolute criterion-God.
RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra note 4, at 136. Pope Benedict XVI rejects the
"natural laws of history." Id. at 137.
66. "[In Plato,] a process that repeats itself ever anew. After each fall, history
begins again at the beginning with different subjects. It has no definitive direc-
tion; it is a cycle of repetitions .... [Elverything that has come into being also
perishes." RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra note 4, at 133-34.
67. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 26.
68. Id. 28(a).
69. Id. 28(a).
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consequence that politics and the State remain, for Pope Benedict no less
than Augustine, always an ambiguous phenomenon.
In its aggregation of power, the State can, at any time, become an
engine of criminal oppression, as Augustine warns, and Pope Benedict
echoes, "a bunch of thieves."70 Thus, Benedict observes that, as Augustine
asserted, political reason operates in need of "constant purification,"71 is
"so often profoundly obscured in the course of time," 72 and is always sub-
ject to "blind spots" and in danger of a certain "ethical blindness." 73 It
formulates its programs in the context of "conflict with situations of per-
sonal interest. 7 4
Even where man is not blinded, and searches in good faith, Pope Ben-
edict, like Augustine, holds that human b;,-. " are radically without con-
trol over outcomes, asserting that practical reason remains insufficient,
and that "fully resolving every problem" is impossible. 75 In his view, it is
axiomatic that the future always is at best uncertain, "immersed [as] every-
one [is] in the dramatic complexity of historical events."7 6 Life is, to some
irreducible extent, unavoidably lived by men in "bewilderment and [a]
failure to understand the world around them .... ,,77
Pope Benedict does not assert in Deus caritas est that the just ordering
of society can draw effectively on an objectively verifiable set of concepts in
the sense cherished by the thomist-aristotlean tradition. Rather, Pope
Benedict consistently depicts the State as constructing a program on ad
hoc terms of "how justice can be achieved here and now," relying on prac-
tical reason's answers, which arise as matter for politics. 78 In this view, the
ongoing task is the 'just ordering of the collectivity," 79 or, in other parallel
formulations, the "[b]uilding a just social and civil order,"8 0 and "the just
structuring of society,"8 but this task of "greater insight into the authentic
requirements of justice,"8 2 belongs not to a prescriptive cognitively
grounded moral philosophy as such, but rather to "the world of politics,"
70. Id. 28(a). The Pope quotes Augustine: "A State which is not governed
according to justice would be just a bunch of thieves: 'Remota itaque iustitia quid
sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia?"' Id. In A TURNING PoIrNr FOR EUROPE, the Pope
points out that this idea was first pronounced by Seneca, who was killed by Nero,
and later by Tacitius and the Stoics. See RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra note 4,
at 129 (citing ENDRE VON IvANKA, RHOMARREICH UND GoTTESVOLK 17 (Freiburg
1968)) (examining origins of "state as robber band").
71. Deus caritas est, supra note 6, 28(a).
72. Id. 31.
73. Id. 28(a).
74. Id.
75. Id. 36.
76. Id. 38.
77. Id.
78. Id. I 28(a).
79. Id. 26.
80. Id. 28(a).
81. Id. 1 27.
82. Id. 27(a).
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which is, in fact the proper, "sphere of the autonomous . . . reason.18 3
Politics, so conceived, provides the "essential task which every generation
must take up anew."84 "[T]he requirements ofjustice" are "achiev[ed]
politically" 85 and in a "political battle."
86
True, at the heart of this unfolding political struggle to name and
achieve a just society, Pope Benedict acknowledges that practical reason
receives direction from "reason and natural law."8 7 But, this direction lies
primarily through the intelligibility of "the radical question, What is Jus-
tice?"88 Practical reason cares to pursue this question as response to "the
command of love of neighbor [that] is inscribed by the Creator in man's
very nature."89 Motivated by natural social beneficence, practical reason
seeks to develop a "true humanism" that "wants to help [man] to live in a
way consonant with [his] dignity" and respecting the "rights and needs of
everyone."90
But, again, this knowledge takes shape concretely; it seems, mainly in
"spontaneity."9 1 The knowledge is uncertain and "so often profoundly ob-
scured in the course of time."92 Practical reason functions optimally, only
where animated by a "reawakening of those moral forces,"9 3 that can sus-
tain a requisite "openness of mind and will to the demands of the com-
mon good."94 The demands of the common good are encountered, not
so much through Thomist-Aristotlean concepts of man's social nature, but
especially in the frustration concretely observed in thwarted human needs
and desires. 95 While some nonnegotiable principles are knowable and
call for unqualified respect,96 they are, as Alan Gewirth points out, too
83. Id. 29.
84. Id. 27(a).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. 28(a).
88. Id.
89. Id. 31. "Thus ajustice that is more than the regulation of group interests
must be subordinate to a universal criterion." RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra
note 4, at 139. The Pope mentions "the universal common good... [t]he good
behind and above all good things .... " Id. at 140.
90. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 30(b).
91. Id. 28(b).
92. Id. 31 ("So often profoundly obscured in the course of time.").
93. Id. 28(a). "[S]he has to reawaken the spiritual energy without which
justice, which always demands sacrifice, cannot prevail and prosper." Id.
94. Id.
95. The Pope holds that "[tihe suffering of the oppressed becomes here the
hermeneutical locus in which knowledge of the truth dawns." RATZINGER, A TURN-
ING POINT, supra note 4, at 141. Although he stipulates that this knowledge is speci-
fied "on the basis of what is in accord with the nature of every human being."
DEus CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 28 (a).
96. Thus, the first and most urgent imperative seems to me the renewed
recognition of the place of the moral sphere in its inviolability and dig-
nity. The distinguishing mark of man is that he not only acknowledges
his physical inability to do something as a limit but also freely respects the
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diffuse to be able to give concrete guidance on most issues.9 7 Politics,
then, contributes to a better world by "doing good now, with full commit-
ment and wherever [it] ha[s] the opportunity," transcending all "strate-
gies and programs."9 8
Like Augustine, Pope Benedict sees as a key to the full functioning of
practical reason the necessity of overcoming sin. Admittedly, the sin that
concerns him is not that of unruly private interests requiring a law-and-
order response as in Augustine. Instead, Pope Benedict finds the para-
digm of sin in the functionaries to be overweening state succumbing to
presumption. The correction that is needed, according to the Pope, is the
cultivation of mindfulness of the radical limits in what one can know con-
cerning, and do fulfilling basic human need. Ic suggests that an attitude
of modesty in our moral epistemology opens us to embrace two critical
adjunct supports for authentic practical reason and action, both attitudes
of the will: courage and spiritual energy refusing resignation, on the one
hand; and a readiness to accept self-sacrifice offsetting the ubiquitous
blindness of self-interest, on the other.99
These attitudes have a double application for Pope Benedict. First, in
a parallel to what Augustine would have said regarding the duty of the
State to respect the freedom of the Church in its sphere, Pope Benedict
says that the formation of the State must proceed under a principle of
"subsidiarity" or limited government distinguishing its own making and
execution of law from the open life of society with its free formation of
belief and opinion. 10 0 Second, in society's pursuit of the lractical reason
of politics, in this latter sphere, the distinction must reign that what polit-
moral prohibition against doing something as an equally binding and
real limit.
RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra note 4, at 171.
97. Gewirth observes that the process of specification and deduction stipu-
lated by Thomas Aquinas for deriving concrete norms from the general require-
ments of natural law are underdetermined. See ALAN GEWIRTH, REAsON AND
MORALITY 279 (1978). Pope Benedict asserts that the truth of natural law depends
on a primordial act of recognition by stating "the inner origin of this rationality
and the foundations that make it meaningful-the recognition of the Logos as the
foundations of all things, a glimpse of the truth that is also the criterion of the
good." RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra note 4, at 142.
98. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 31(a)
99. Faith's hope always goes infinitely farther than all our realizations,
reaching into the realm of the eternal; but precisely the fact that this
hope is given to us gives us the courage to take up again and again, de-
spte all inadequacy, the struggle for a just order that is the form of free-
dom and builds up a dam against the tyranny of injustice.
RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra note 4, at 77.
100. We have said that the state is not the Kingdom of God; the state
itself cannot generate morality. It remains a good state precisely when it
keeps to these boundaries. But at the same time, it is true that the state
lives on the basis of transpolitical foundations and that it can remain
good only when these foundations, which it does not itself produce, re-
main in force.
Id. at 138.
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ics can accomplish although real, as Augustine taught, is strictly limited.
Even at the conclusion of successful political engagement on behalf of
justice and all other aspects of human fulfillment, there remains, mas-
sively, a presence of "incomprehensible and apparently unjustified suffer-
ing in the world."1 01
Man appropriately expresses his will for justice, therefore, not exclu-
sively through his political thought and action, but by a residual religious
response to the totality of lived human experience in an attitude of
"piety," grieving for what he cannot do in the end, acknowledging that
" [i]t is God who governs the world, not we." 10 2 Like Job, man expresses
grief, before God, in a cry from the depths of his soul, over the irremedia-
ble remainder of injustice man is unable to redress. 10 3 Pope Benedict as-
serts, as did Augustine before him, that man, upon acknowledging his own
limits, ought to turn in grief and hope to God.
2. Pope Benedict's Modifications of Augustinianism
The undeniably Augustinian provenance of much of the political the-
ory in Deus caritas est should not distract the reader from the several deci-
sive departures Pope Benedict makes from his great predecessor's
teaching. Augustine assumes that the State serves a largely negative func-
tion of overcoming private sin to ensure minimal public order, but Pope
Benedict takes this function for granted, focusing instead on the State's
role in coordinating and advancing welfare. Where Augustine assumes
that society outside of the Church, dominated by self-love, is incapable of
taking initiatives on behalf of anything more than "splendid vice," Pope
Benedict teaches that society is, in itself, basically good, and capable of
programmatic initiatives for the human good. Augustine considers only
the Church as enjoying an integrity in its initiatives that mandates respect
by the State as inviolable, but Pope Benedict extends this limiting role to
all of civil society to which Pope Benedict gives this non-Augustinian posi-
tive value and within which he has the Church take its own subordinate
place as just one societal actor. Finally, Augustine assumes that political
reason, as exercised by the State, is capable of only calculating stability in
the use of material goods, according to a rough norm of respect for the
equality of persons, but Pope Benedict assumes that both the State and
society are capable of formulating reasonable plans for the substantive ful-
fillment and welfare of the person and the community.
On this last point, so confident is Pope Benedict that a central focus
of his encyclical is his firm endorsement of Activist State bureaucracy.
10 4
101. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 38.
102. Id. 35.
103. See id. 38.
104. Modern scientific thought has increasingly shut us up in the prison
of positivism, thus condemning us to pragmatism. Much can be achieved
by doing so; it is possible to journey to the moon and still farther into the
immensity of the universe. Yet in spite of this, man always remains in the
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Pope Benedict squarely asserts that bureaucracy can be trusted to function
in pliant response to the commands of a caring, intellectually modest and
open-minded politics of justice. As such, Pope Benedict presents an ad-
vanced bureaucracy as not merely desirable, but necessary. He depicts bu-
reaucratic means as essential tools, to eagerly be cultivated, developed and
extended. Pope Benedict endorses the Activist State.
Pope Benedict makes room for this turn within his more generally
Augustinian framework, through a means-ends distinction. With regard to
ends, human beings must, in the encyclical's view, acknowledge that the
attainment of many are simply beyond his ability. In keeping with Kant,
Pope Benedict relinquishes the idea that Augustine shared with Plato: the
idea that an elite can govern with privileged insight into basic ends. With
respect to means, man must acknowledge that not all are prudent under
exigent circumstances. But, once one determines that the pursuit of an
end is appropriate and that the means proposed are prudent, Pope Bene-
dict unmistakably departs from Augustine by suggesting that one should
apply the principle of beneficence with a Bentham-like enthusiasm.
Here, the Pope, with his very extensive experience as an administrator
and ecclesiastical diplomat, can only be aware of the unprecedented effi-
cacy of the instrumentalism arising with the elaboration of modern sys-
tems of positive law. This instrumentalism does not present itself to the
Pope as a hypothetical option. The coordination of the lives of billions of
human beings on today's globe already depend upon it. Pope Benedict's
reason for resolving his Augustinian ambivalence towards the State in
favor of affirming the activist bureaucratic State is the sheer and necessary
dependence, he discerns, for teeming thousands of millions of human be-
ings in a global and technocratic era on the machinery of State bureau-
cracy, for their sustenance. Augustine, by contrast, would have considered
human lives to depend not on the machinery of the State, but on "nature."
The articulation and implementation of such systems of law and bu-
reaucracy received a substantial advance through the insight, at the turn
of modernity, of modern philosophies such as the German Idealism of
Kant, cited above, making possible the insight that meaningful and evolv-
ing human initiatives can be formulated without any metaphysics of the
good, or, in any event, with a historically conditioned version of such met-
aphysics. In a sense, Kant, thus, helped open the door to the systematic
use of law as an instrument of the very utilitarianism he abhorred. As
described above, Pope Benedict's own understanding of the human capac-
ity to know the good in most questions of the social concern is arguably,
through the influence of Kant and other related modern moral philoso-
phies, seen to be under-determined and elective.
same place, because he does not surpass the real limit, which is set by
what can be quantified and produce.
JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, CALLED TO COMMUNION: UNDERSTANDING THE
CHURCH TODAY 144 (Adrian Walker trans., Ignatius Press 1996) [hereinafter RATZ-
INGER, CALLED TO COMMUNION].
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This viewpoint opens the door to a secular understanding of societal
and governmental initiatives, such that one can, from the perspective of
Christian faith, view them skeptically without, however, having to term
them necessarily as sinful. As such, Kant offers an escape from Augustine's
own excessively dualist and Manichean view of society. The reasoning in
question contributes to our ability to view law itself as a neutral instru-
ment. It is by implicitly adopting an element of metaphysically neutral
description of societal and State action that Pope Benedict is able to fit his
vision of the meaning of the social good neatly within the concept of posi-
tive law as the highly effective technocratic means of advancing whatever
projects society chooses to endorse. Pope Benedict, thus, rephrases and
endorses Platonic and Augustinian elites by envisioning servant adminis-
trators with elite access to technology and bureaucratic technique.
It is, therefore, no accident that Pope Benedict's account of the State
assigns key importance to the role notjust of the State, but also of interna-
tional organizations, as instrumentalities of "planning, foresight and coop-
eration. 1 0 5 In its role as the instrumentality of action on behalf of human
need, the State, in Pope Benedict's view, is obligated to cultivate a cadre of
experts with appropriate professional competencies and assigned respon-
sibilities, "in the many different economic, social, legislative, administra-
tive and cultural areas, which are intended to promote organically and
institutionally the common good."10 6 The State action Pope Benedict cites
as paradigmatic are the technically precise, swift and highly organized
mass relief efforts occurring in international crises and disasters. 10 7 With-
out doubt, Pope Benedict theorizes on behalf of the Activist State as the
tool of practical and political reason, in an era that is irreversibly global
and technocratic.
3. Even so, Pope Benedict Calls for "Augustinian" Checks on the Activist State
Pope Benedict's definite and unambiguous endorsement of the Ac-
tivist State does not prevent him from drawing on the reservoir of his Au-
gustinian moral pessimism to flag the continuing dangers of the abuse of
State power, and even of totalitarianism. Having substituted Kant and
Plato for Augustine as described, the Pope no longer understands these
dangers to arise, as already suggested above, so much from the human
inclination or lust overweeningly to pursue the glamour of power and self-
interest, as in Augustine, as from the human disinclination in pride, once
possessed of governmental authority, to accept an inherent limit in our
capacity to solve problems and, correspondingly, to relinquish control in
the face of ineradicable human want and deprivation. The potential for
105. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 31 (b).
106. Id. 1 29.
107. "On the other hand-and here we see one of the challenging yet also
positive sides of the process of globalization-we now have at our disposal numer-
ous means for offering humanitarian assistance to our brothers and sisters in need
.... " Id. 30(a).
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excess now lies in claiming too much for the human capacity to intervene
to right wrongs.
This is the mistake Pope Benedict sees at the root of German ideal-
ism. 108 Pope Benedict may be prepared, implicitly at least, to exploit the
value of the Kantian insight into the descriptive usefulness of the concept
of metaphysically opaque interests, but he draws the line at importing a
mechanism of progress from Kant or his progeny into the necessary dy-
namic of history. This is the balance of Pope Benedict's compromise with
the turn to modernity of German Idealism. Pope Benedict identifies the
later step that he identifies as going too far, with the sin of presumption.
As mentioned above, Pope Benedict cites the collapse of the Marxist re-
gimes in the soviet system at the end of the outgoing century as the lead-
ing historical example of this form of presumption. 10 9
Pope Benedict explains the error in question as arising through phi-
losophies succumbing to the temptation of allowing "the immensity of
others' needs," to "drive" it "towards an ideology that would aim at doing
what God's governance of the world apparently cannot: fully resolving
every problem.""10 The implicit assertion that man can place himself in
the role of God, declaring that "the apocalypse is now!""' "Disdain [ing]"
real humans whom they could see for "a future whose effective realization
is at best doubtful," Pope Benedict asserts that Marxists, then, sacrificed
concrete human lives "to the moloch of the future." 112 He seizes the occa-
sion of the downfall of Marxism, as a teaching moment, to bring home the
decisive turn in his Christian philosophy of politics: in true solidarity with
the victims of history-"as it is yet to come, the apocalypse is not now."
108. In principle, Pope Benedict would presumably find a parallel mistake in
Plato's assurance that organic societal structures can perfect human nature within
the horizon of human history alone.
109. But this means that the field of political activity is not the future but
the present. The politician is not one who arranges a better world that
will arrive at some time or other: rather, his responsibility is that the
world today should be good so that it may also be good tomorrow.... We
must learn to say good-bye to the myth of innerworldly eschatologies. We
then serve tomorrow best when we are good today and when we shape
today in a spirit of responsibility for what is good today and tomorrow.
RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra note 4, at 136-37.
110. "When we consider the immensity of others' needs, we can, on the one
hand, be driven towards an ideology that would aim at doing what God's govern-
ance of the world apparently cannot: fully resolve every problem." DEUs CARITAS
EST, supra note 6, 36. A distortion of practical reason, "the truth with which man
is concerned is neither the truth of being, nor even in the last resort that of his
accomplished deeds, but the truth of changing the world, moulding the world-a
truth centered on future and action." JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION
TO CHRISTIANITY 35 (J.R. Foster trans., Herder and Herder) (1970) [hereinafter
RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY].
111. "[D]oing what God's governance of the world apparently cannot: fully
resolving every problem." DEUs CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 36. "It is God who
governs the world, not we." Id. 35.
112. Id. 31(b).
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If Marxism exits the road of practical reasonableness through one
gate, Pope Benedict emphasizes that advanced bureaucratic systems of
contemporary North America and Europe can exit, in a manner no less
regrettable, through another. Where Marxism overstates control over the
realization of a just future, he observes that liberal bureaucracies may be
tempted to treat the law as nothing "more than a mere mechanism for
defining the rules of public life," 113 succumbing to the temptation to "reg-
ulate[ ] and control[ ] everything," "provide everything" and "absorbing
everything into itself,"' 14 excluding the spiritual dimension of human be-
ings, ultimately, thereby, advancing "a materialist conception of man." 1 15
Pope Benedict implicitly follows Augustine in judging that when the pro-
gressive bureaucracy of the liberal State goes that far, it is "incapable of
guaranteeing the very thing which the suffering person-every person-
needs: namely, loving personal concern." 116
The error of such a hyper-governmental-bureaucracy, in the Pope's
view, would be the presumption of the State's failing to acknowledge its
limited role as a mere instrumentality that must yield, at critical points, to
a separate and complementary sphere of human freedom, according to
the principle of "subsidiarity" or limited government. 1 7 Among the di-
verse initiatives undertaken in human society as a matter of freedom,
there is, in Pope Benedict's view, to be found not just a blend of sin and
descriptively neutral self-interest. There is also the genuine expression of
practical reason's fullest orientation to the real demands of justice. The
State, in Pope Benedict's view, must bow to this higher insight, and ac-
knowledge that it is ultimately its tool. Augustine assumed that the virtu-
ous ruler could directly know and carry out the requirements of justice.
Pope Benedict, influenced by modernity, assumes that the ruler can only
do so by enacting the mandate of society's political process. Here Pope
Benedict balances a non-Augustinian endorsement of societal cohesion as
an expression of genuine love of neighbor with a continuing sober Augus-
tinian concern for the potential of abuse of power. The danger he sees in
liberal bureaucracy is not imminent eschatology as in Marxism, but the
nihilism of unchecked State instrumentalism.
113. Id. 28(a).
114. Id. 28(b). "Faith is not the resignation of reason in view of the limits of
our knowledge; it is not a retreat into the irrational in view of the dangers of a
merely instrumental reason." RATZINGER, A TURNING PoINT, supra note 4, at 104.
115. DEus cARITAs EST, supra note 6, 28(b).
116. Id.
117. On another level, the problem is the idea of Enlightenment:
[T] he privatization of morality, on the one hand, and in its reduction, on
the other hand, to the calculation of what will be successful, of what
promises better chances of survival. This makes a society an immoral so-
ciety in its public and communal essence-or, in other words, a society
that attaches no value to what really gives dignity to man and constitutes
him as a human person.
RATzINGER, A TURNING PoINT, supra note 4, at 171.
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3. Pope Benedict's Distinctive Alteration of Augustinian Dualism
Pope Benedict's departures from Augustine ensure that his thought
assumes its own original pattern of dualism. The two spheres, into which
Pope Benedict assigns human experience, are dedicated, on the one
hand, to practical reason, as such, operating within the human capacity to
effectuate outcomes according to the measure ofjustice, politically format-
ted, and, on the other, to a graced love of humanity, overshooting the
limits of what practical reason can know and accomplish politically, in a
constant readiness to volunteer to do more. The reconciliation of
spheres, in this bifurcated view, arises through love's taking, as the subject
matter of its concern, but with its longer view, the very same terms absorb-
ing the sphere of practical action, and by the sphere of practical action's
accepting insight and direction through viewpoints actually steeped in the
attitudes of the sphere of divine love. Functionally, the sphere of love
enters -into the service of the sphere of justice, and the sphere of justice
respects the untouchable freedom of the personal experience of divine
love. Metaphysically, Pope Benedict's dualism resolves to unity through
the human person who at once is of the world and transcends it.
Returning to something like the monism of Plato, Pope Benedict re-
jects the irreducible dualism of both Augustine and Kant. He agrees that
that the dynamic of self-interest fundamentally shapes the world but he
rejects Augustine's assertion that this dynamic is intrinsically depraved and
fallen. He also rejects Augustine's triumphant assumption that the elected
are separated from the world by their alignment with the will of God, sub-
stituting instead that the measure of alignment with God's will is precisely
a confession of a loss of control and a posture of service. On the other
hand, Pope Benedict declines equally Kant's assertion that the dynamic of
the world is one of interests intrinsically and irreversibly opaque to meta-
physical or moral meaning. He also declines Kant's assumption that the
moral agent's interior experience of an upright will be a purely autono-
mous measure of right and wrong.
Pope Benedict's is a mediating position, which refuses, as well, to
adopt the full unity of Plato. Pope Benedict envisions a unity of spheres
that, while overlapping, is not one of simple identity. Human participa-
tion in the sphere of love cannot ever be fully satisfied by its impact in the
sphere of practical reason. It comes to rest, finally, only in a religious
attitude of religious thanksgiving and lamentation, before God, in the face
of the enormity of what human beings cannot accomplish. The sphere of
practical action, moreover, must deal here and now with both sin and vast
numbers of elective imponderables opaque to metaphysical meaning and
moral interpretation, and beyond the competency of the intuition of love
alone.
On a theological level, the balance of unity and disunity Pope Bene-
dict brings to his schema follows, in a variation on Augustine, at once from
both the created nature of the human person and from the Redemption.
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The fundamental dualism of Pope Benedict's schema arises when the
human being encounters irreducible created limit of what he can accom-
plish for justice. Its bifurcation of basic attitudes in the human response
to reality is brought succinctly to expression in Reinhold Niebuhr's seren-
ity prayer, which becomes a core question at the threshold of practical
reason. The presence of sin in the world makes this adjustment more
anguished and poignant. The insight of reason and the experience of sin
become preambles of faith made possible by the love of God manifest in
Christ. By accepting Christ, man gains entry to the sphere of charity in a
whole new way, and thereby dynamically transforms charity's impact on
the sphere of practical action.
4. Mediating Augustine and Modernity
The normative view of the State Pope Benedict proposes in Deus
caritas est, while undeniably, indeed expressly, Augustinian, 118 overcomes
Augustinian dualism ultimately by rejecting the primacy Augustine gives
sin. 119 Pope Benedict, in pointed contrast to Augustine, specifically
blesses self-interested love, eros, as good, and finds it antecedent in God
himself. For Pope Benedict, in contrast to Augustine, self-interest only be-
comes sinful when it refuses to yield to the self-sacrifice that, at times, in
Pope Benedict's scheme is a requirement of practical reason on behalf of
the common good. Pope Benedict, in pointed contrast to Augustine,
states that the love of neighbor is instilled in man as a matter of his created
nature, to this same extent, uncorrupted by sin. For Pope Benedict, prac-
tical reason possesses, in the political sphere, then, two assets it lacks in
Augustine who remains influenced to that same degree by Manichaeism:
the two well-ordered loves of healthy self-interest and genuine love of
others.
For Augustine, as noted, the sphere of the State, even where governed
with justice, at best, reflects a mere tranquility of material order, and,
within that sphere, the only common dynamic that engages the mass of
society who are fallen, no less than the few who are saved, lies in a predom-
inance of shared fear of material loss, over the balance of shared hope of
self-gain through private aggression, should such aggression escape regula-
tion by the State. For Pope Benedict, by contrast, the sphere of society
served by the State is one of well-ordered loves of self and other and soci-
ety finding its common dynamic in the many fruitful initiatives of freedom
for all.
Where Pope Benedict evinces pessimism, and he does evince pessi-
mism, that pessimism, albeit of a genuinely Augustinian flavor, arises-
without undue stress on human fault-an awareness of a sobering substan-
tial inherent limit that exists to the capacity of reason to resolve human
118. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 28(a) (quoting Augustine).
119. "Sobriety not resignation." RATZINGER, A TURNING PoTr, supra note 4,
at 136.
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problems, and, not intrinsically, but merely contingently, through sin, an
ever-present possibility, in fact, of interposing itself as counterforce. The
sin that absorbs Pope Benedict's attention is not the sin of the bank rob-
ber or card shark or even of tyrants as such, but rather of governmental
actors abusing power in pursuit of the alleged public interest. The cause
of the false turn that concerns Pope Benedict is not overt self-seeking, but
rather the presumptuous quest to control and dominate the future or the
human person in the present in initiatives allegedly for the good.
Pope Benedict constructs a concept of the temporal sphere which, in
contrast to Augustine's, is other than essentially sinful. Equally, he con-
structs one which, in contrast to Plato's, is other than fully metaphysically
transparent to realizable ideals. To understand how Pope Benedict ac-
complishes this balance, one must return, first, to Pope Benedict's en-
dorsement of self-interest as an expression of a legitimate self-love. To this
endorsement of self-interest, one may conjoin Pope Benedict's view of
practical reason in the tradition of Kant, as being limited in its capacity to
reach definitive answers about the normative significance of conflicting
interests, as such. Finally, one must return, as well, to Pope Benedict's
central theological motif, namely the divine dialectic by which God him-
self forever, turns his own love "against his own justice" for the sake of
forgiving the fallen human race whom he loves.
According to this motif, in Christ, God essentially acts, within history,
to alter the reality of the meaning of moral action. Rather than Christ's
merely perfecting man's participation in created categories of reason and
being, he transforms what these categories mean by superseding them. In
a sense, after Christ, one can say that all bets are off. All values are super-
seded in the service of Christ's Love. Practical reason itself can be ap-
proached differently. It is on this soteriological foundation that Pope
Benedict is inspired to assert that human beings, working with situations
of interests in conflict which otherwise would appear metaphysically
opaque, can discover and validate, as morally fitting, through the political
process, a pragmatic fulfillment of immediate human self-perceived needs.
Pope Benedict creates a Christian analogue to the neutral satisfaction
of individual preferences which modern liberal theories make the mea-
sure of social welfare. He, thereby, preserves a basis for the Church's de-
fense of specific (if circumscribed moral agenda) based on an enduring
Christian commitment to just several nonnegotiable intrinsic moral
norms, while, nonetheless, also justifying the State's massive involvement
in the pursuit of the general welfare on a basis of moral pluralism. In this
fashion, one explains the novel phenomenon of a political perspective
that is both "Augustinian" and firmly subscriptive of the Activist State.
III. BENEDICT'S THEOLOGY OF THE CHURCH
To complete an account of Pope Benedict's philosophy of Church
and State, it is necessary to briefly introduce, as well, an explication of his
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theology of Church, i.e., his ecclesiology. Here again, it is possible, within
the boundaries of orthodox belief, to select in one's choice of fundamen-
tals from alternative traditions within Catholicism. To cite a tradition that
again Pope Benedict does not prefer: Aquinas considers the natural unity
of human society within the intelligible order of creation to provide the
terms needed to understand, by analogy, the Church in the order of
grace. 120 Pope Benedict, by contrast, follows Augustine, who conceives of
the Church as being born at that moment when the will of the creature
who loves "not wisely but too well,"1 2 1 receives a second chance in an un-
precedented event in time, and, thereby, becomes free to will, as God, who
transcends his creation, wills and, thereby, through faith, by degrees, to
take his place within an invisible eternal city to come, which the Church,
in its present earthly form, now only dimly mirrors. Thomas's ecclesiology
relies easily, if analogously, on substantive ontological concepts describing
created realities. Augustine's ecclesiology, instead, predictably relies more
on the conversion of the will, procedural priorities among competing free-
doms, and intuition. Pope Benedict's ecclesiology is in continuity with the
Augustinian option, adjusted to conform to the shifts in philosophy devel-
oped above.
The Church, for Pope Benedict, arises not from "an ethical choice or
lofty idea," but through "an event" in history caused by God's love for
Man. 122 The Church's nature is not made evident by reference to con-
cepts ultimately intelligible through analogy to created natures themselves
mirroring aspects of the uncreated divine intellect, but rather by reference
to concepts descriptive of elections of the Divine will. Pope Benedict sees
the world itself as having come to be through "the power" of God's "crea-
tive Word."' 23 He sees mankind as receiving its "image,, and its "destiny,"
not through a tinplate that can be intuited or inferred in the mind of the
Creator, but rather through God's choice to love man who had fallen. 124
The logos-primordial reason-the first principle of Aristotle, the abso-
lute and ultimate source of all being reveals himself to be "personal and
loving."125
The Church enters history, in Benedict's view, when God, in a com-
pletely free, "unpredictable and in some sense unprecedented" act,126
loves us, and we, "can express the fundamental decision of his life," and
120. Specifically, he uses concepts of power and jurisdiction. See SAINT
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA Theologica, reprinted in BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS
AQUINAS 365-67 (Anton C. Pegis ed., Hacket Publishing Company) (1945).
121. "Then must you speak Of one that loved not wisely but too well; Of one
not easilyjealous, but being wrought perplex'd in the extreme; of one whose hand,
like the base indian, threw a pearl away richer than all his tribe." WILLIAM SHAKE-
SPEARE, OTHELLO act 5, sc. 2.
122. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 1.
123. Id. 9.
124. Id.
125. Id. 10.
126. Id. 12.
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love him in return.1 27 In spite of what many may have become accus-
tomed to expect through a past emphasis by some on the "descending" or
agapic character of Christian love, Pope Benedict invites us to consider
that God desires us in a love, that is properly "ascending," or of eros, for
God loves us for himself, "against all reason." 128 In this love for us, God is
so drawn to possess us that he turns even "against himself," and even goes
so far as to "turn[ ] his love against his justice." 129 The paradox in this
moment of reversal is that God himself, in the person of Christ, through
the descending oblative and agapic self-sacrifice makes possible the fulfill-
ment of the descending fulfillment of divine eros.
130
Upon first having been loved and upon having received love "as gift,"
the human response is to "love in return." This response co-contributes to
the Church's creation. It is, then, by loving in response to God's gift of
love, not by obedience to a command, that we make the Church possi-
ble.' 3 1 The Church is grounded radically, not in God's judgment, but in
his unjustifiable love, as it is also, not in our responding to a duty of "ven-
geance or a duty of hatred and violence"13 2 as in certain religious fanati-
cisms, but of rather, to our responding in love to a gift of love first
received.
The Church, it is true, emerges, in Pope Benedict's schema, through
the fundamental individual decision of belief. At the same time, by its
nature, a response to the love of God also leads the believer at once to be
"drawn at . . . to unity with all those have become or who will become
[God's] own." 133 The Church, thus, has intrinsically the dynamic of com-
munity, and necessarily ab initio constitutes itself "through sacrament and
proclamation" in "the formation of community."13 4 Pope Benedict does
not neglect the cosmic dimension of the Church's reality. In his vision,
the human response the Church represents to God, in a real sense,
"causes the light of God to enter into the world,"135 and the living commu-
nity of the Church transcends, and continues after, death "in saints
through aligned wills."
1 36
127. Id. 1.
128. Id. 10; see also eros as an overpowering of Reason by a "divine mad-
ness." Id. 4.
129. Id. 10.
130. "Jesus gave this act of oblation... His death on the cross is the culmina-
tion of that turning of God against himself in which he gives himself in order to
raise man up and save him." Id. 12-13.
131. Id. 1 1, 9, 14.
132. Id. 1.
133. Id. 14.
134. Id. 25(a).
135. "Seeing with the eyes of Christ." Id. 18.
136. "The lives of the Saints are not limited to their earthly biographies but
also include their being and working in God after death." Id. 42.
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A. The Church as Social Actor
The communitarian dynamic that is constitutive of Church is, moreo-
ver, in Pope Benedict's view, not merely internal to the Church but rather
embraces universally the human race as such, without regard to what the
Church receives in return or whether the recipient responds to the faith
proclamation of the Church with assent.13 7 The contrast to Augustine
who saw the Church as an ark sheltering those who withdrew from the
massa damnata is striking. Concretely, the impulse of the Church, in Pope
Benedict, finds its expression as diakonia or the ministry of service that is
an essential mark of the Church. The Church is, in its essence, not exclu-
sively a community of faith; it is also an expression of a love that seeks the
integral good of man and humanity a single family." 13 8 The Church, Pope
Benedict holds, is called in a direct relation to love every human being. 139
This call begins with concern for the "outward necessities" of all, but, at its
deepest level, it has regard for each human person's "inner need to be
loved," attending in "intimate response," not merely to outward welfare,
but to the inner experience of suffering, loneliness, discouragement and
isolation. 140 For the purposes of the present article, it is critical to attend
to how Pope Benedict more precisely considers the Church's call to uni-
versal service in the world to be constitutive of the Church as community
of faith.
Pope Benedict sets forth the Church's mission of universal service as
inherently subject to a dual exposition under the separate rubrics of jus-
tice and charity, where, within the temporal sphere,justice corresponds to
the realm of the State and charity to that of freedom in civil society. 14 1 At
another level, this division corresponds as well to the difference between
practical reason as the measure ofjustice, and faith as the source of charity
in keeping with the dual spheres described earlier. In Pope Benedict's
moral epistemology, both faith and reason have a common origin in an
attitude of love of neighbor. The Church's mission therefore has a role in
the sphere of justice.
In Pope Benedict's framework, all coordination resolving issues ofjus-
tice necessarily occurs, as noted above, through politics and State action,
generally, while action on behalf of charity may occur, by contrast,
through all manner of intermediate social groups, the Church being but
137. "Love is free; it is not practiced as a way of achieving other ends." Id.
31(c).
138. Id. 25(b).
139. Id.
140. Id. 28(b).
141. "The Idea of the Separation of Church and state came into the world
first through Christianity. Until then the political constitution and religion were
always united. It was the norm in all cultures for the state to have sacrality in itself
and be the supreme protection of sacrality." JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, SALT OF
THE EARTH 239 (Adrian Walker trans., Ignatius Press) (1997) [hereinafter RATZ-
INGER, SALT OF THE EARTH]. "Christianity always refused, at least at the beginning,
to see itself as a state religion but distinguished itself from the state." Id. at 240.
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one of these, inspired by natural or created love of neighbor, and, as was
also noted above, legitimately pursuing their diverse initiatives without
awaiting coordination through politics or State oversight. Pope Benedict
presents the Church's mission of universal service as intrinsically and
strictly divisible corresponding to these structural temporal spheres of
State and society.
Pope Benedict extends the Church's mission of social service to con-
cern over the proper functioning of the State, but he adds the proviso that
the Church may express this concern only upon acknowledging that the
sphere of practical reason belongs inherently to the State and the politics
that guides it. This acknowledgement takes the form of a necessary disa-
vowal of any direct engagement on behalf of justice. He holds that the
Church's contribution to politics is, intrinsically, limited to the offer of
indirect support of others whose task politics properly is. Conversely, as an
intermediate societal association, the Church is authorized, in this view, to
undertake, as its opus proprium, its own concrete charitable projects. As it
does so, the Church is properly considered an essentially equal partner in
cooperative projects with the State.
B. The Church's Indirect Mission to the World
In the sphere of politics, Pope Benedict's strictly bifurcated scheme,
in vivid contrast to St. Augustine's, calls for the Church to renounce con-
trol over the State. This renunciation must extend even to the formula-
tion of the criteria of justice describing upright and prudent state action
in concrete circumstances. 14 2 The appropriate source of such criteria,
rather, is practical reason, which assumes only a minimal orientation to
the "love of neighbor" implanted by the Creator. While Pope Benedict
holds that only the love of God in Christ, in fact, even in temporal affairs,
elevates practical reason to a fully adequate grasp of the common good, he
also treated it as axiomatic that the "bargain" by which one can win this
perspective is in a leap of faith by which one expands the scope of one's
concern to reach unrestricted global regard for all that man cannot control
through his own political action.
The Church makes its contribution to the cause ofjustice, as an inter-
mediate institution within society. Given its distinctive nature, the Church
must, rather than directly advancing programs, indirectly, aiming, on the
level of attitude, seeking to awaken, expand, and elevate society's energies
in the cause of caring about justice. It may have its influence by forming
142. "Christian charitable activity must be independent of parties and ideolo-
gies. It is not a means of engaging the world ideologically, and it is not at the
service of worldly stratagems, but it is a way of making present here and now the
love which man always needs." DEus CARTrAS EST, supra note 6, 31 (b). "We con-
tribute to a better world only by personally doing good now, with full commitment
and wherever we have the opportunity, independently of partisan strategies and
programs ... the programme of Jesus-is a 'a heart which sees.' This heart sees
where love is needed and acts accordingly." Id.
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the conscience of its laity. 143 It may also have it on a society's capacity for
practical reason in the service of justice, through the leavening effect of
Christian faith and witness throughout society.
Where the Church finds it necessary to become more concrete and
actually to propose solutions on questions of social justice, Pope Benedict
insists it must, at most, limit itself to "guidelines," to be "addressed in the
context of dialogue with all those seriously concerned for humanity and
for the world in which we live."1 44 The occasion of Deus caritas est, while, in
one sense, as described above, was the collapse of Marxism, it was, in an-
other sense, as Cardinal Dulles points out, Pope Benedict's belief that a
parallel error in reasoning had entered into discourse on social justice
within Catholicism in the waning twentieth century. 145 A key manifesta-
tion had appeared, he believed, in an "activism and the growing secular-
ism of many Christians engaged in charitable work."1 46 Pope Benedict
detects a characteristic style of complacency, underlying this attitude, rest-
ing in an unwarranted assumption that Catholics possess adequate
grounds in practical reason and in technical scientific knowledge to sup-
port detailed practical answers to complex social questions.
It was commonplace, immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989, for Catholic social and political commentators, to observe that the
Church, in steering the virtuous middle course between Marx and the
Manchester School from the late nineteenth century on, had with what
appears, in retrospect, to be remarkable and inspired prescience it have
"gotten it right." In hindsight, Catholic Social Thought appears to have
envisioned and prescribed the welfare state, and to have rejected the ex-
tremes of communism and laissez-faire capitalism. Pope Benedict inter-
prets an overly complacent satisfaction in this Catholic success
(significantly, the pertinent commentators are not equally focusing on in-
quiring into the question of the various alleged Catholic failures in the
same period), as a sign, in fact, of the same sin that is at the heart of the
political ideologies the Pope critiques, that of "presumption." 147 Human
beings, in the face of the collective enormity of human suffering purport
to do what God himself cannot: "fully resolving every problem.' 48
In a brilliant dialectic, the Pope has chosen the well-received publica-
tion of the summary Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church to dis-
143. The mission of the lay faithful is therefore to configure social life
correctly, respecting its legitimate autonomy and cooperating with other
citizens .... Even if the specific expressions of ecclesial charity can never
be confused with the activity of the State, it still remains true that charity
must animate the entire lives of the lay faithful and therefore also their
political activity, lived as "social charity."
Id. 29.
144. Id. 27.
145. Dulles, supra note 7, at 250-51.
146. DEus CARUTAS EST, supra note 6, 37.
147. Id. 35.
148. Id. 36.
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count the claim that the Church has anything more to say about matters of
social justice than is, while for its purpose essential, with regard to techni-
cal questions merely provisional and suggestive. Far from claiming that
the Church has the decisive contribution to make on these issues, he
pointedly affirms that "it must be admitted" that far from having a privi-
leged source of political knowledge, even for the time, the Church's lead-
ership was slow to realize that the issue of the just structuring of society
needed to be approached in a new way."1 49 In short, Pope Benedict's re-
joinder to an undue enthusiasm on the part of some recent Catholic theo-
logians and social ethicists for the Church's participation in politics, is the
same as it was to the theorists of the Age of Social Revolution: "There is an
Apocalypse Yet to Come, But It is Not Now."
Although insisting that this influence of the Church on politics must
always remain merely indirect, and in its institutional manifestation quite
modest, Pope Benedict, nonetheless, holds that the broader cultural influ-
ence of the Church on this level to be huge-practically tectonic-in
scale. 150 Pope Benedict believes that the transformative effect of divine
love on practical reason uniquely serves to offset practical reason's inher-
ently underdetermined and shakable character. The impact of this trans-
formation is on the quality of political engagement and deliberation in the
evaluation of unique circumstances. The Church thus ultimately has its
primary impact on justice not through the promulgation of concrete pro-
posals, but on the gradual transformation of culture and leavening of so-
cial attitudes that radically raise the potential for effective politics within
the society which gives host to the Church.1 5 1
It is worth carefully explicating the alteration that Pope Benedict
predicts the Christianization of social attitudes inherently to portend for
the level of the politics of practical reason. He explicates this transforma-
tion as, above all, arising through an underlying renewal of the will.1 52 In
149. "It must be admitted that the Church's leadership was slow to realize that
the issue of the just structuring of society needed to be approached in a new way.
There were some pioneers, such as Bishop Ketteler of Mainz (d. 1877) .... " Id.
27. The Pope "gives credit to religious orders . . . in the nineteenth century to
combat poverty, disease and the need for better education" Id. 27.
150. "The struggle for the new presence of the rationality of faith is what I
regard as an urgent task for the Church in our century." JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZ-
INGER, PILGRIM FELLOWSHIP OF FAITH: THE CHURCH AS COMMUNION 291 (Henry Tay-
lor trans., Ignatius Press) (2005) [hereinafter RATZINGER, PILGRIM FELLOWSHIP OF
FAITH].
151. "The attempt to learn from living together with God how men should
live together." RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra note 4, at 141. "An awareness
of the great moral tradition of Christianity, to the pre- or meta-dogmatic core so to
speak of its moral constants" and "to recognize this as our spiritual and intellectual
identity." Id. at 173. "[N]ot through institutional strength but through witness,
through love, life and suffering: and in this way she must help society to find its
moral identity." Id. at 175.
152. Thomas says.., that here the thought process and the assent bal-
ance each other, they are "ex aequo." What does that mean? First, it
means that in the act of believing the assent comes about in a different
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a parallel to Plato's resort to his version of moral and intellectual conver-
sion and discipline permitting the ascent from the cave of appearances to
the light of the mind, for Pope Benedict, when Christian believers place
themselves completely at the disposal of God's initiative, they attune their
thoughts to God and their will inclines towards unity with the will of God.
Thus, God's way of loving becomes the measure of human love,
1 53
thereby, "lift[ing] us to far greater heights than anything that any human
... elevation could ever accomplish."1 54 The radical renewal of the will,
that is entailed in this "elevation," "give [s] life a new horizon and a deci-
sive direction," and awakens more fully "all man's potentialities." 155 The
"direct submission of the will to the will of God"-the "yes of our will to his
will"-"calls into play all man's potentialities, it engages the whole man so
to speak," unifying "our intellect, will and sentiments in the all embracing
act of all." 156 Among other influences, we experience, critically, an awak-
ening, in ourselves, of "joy in truth and righteousness." 157 It answers a
way from the way it does in the act of knowing: not through the degree of
evidence bringing the process of thought to its conclusion, but by an act
of will, in connection with which the thought process remains open and
still underway. Here, the degree of evidence does not turn the thought
into assent; rather, the will commands assent, even though the thought
process is still under way .... What Thomas calls the will corresponds
roughly to what in biblical language is called "the heart." Thus, Pascal's
well-known saying comes to mind: "Le coeur a ses raisons, que la raison ne
connait point." The heart has its reasons; it has its own rationality, which
reaches beyond "mere" reason .... Any perception presupposes a cer-
tain sympathy with what is perceived. Without a certain inner closeness, a
kind of [ove, we cannot perceive the other thing or person. In this sense
the "will" always somehow precedes the perception and is its precondi-
tion; and the more so, the greater and more inclusive is the reality to be
Serceived. We are able to give the assent of faith because the will-the
eart-has been touched by God, "affected" by him. Through being
touched in this way, the will knows that even what is still not "clear" to the
reason is true. Assent is produced by the will, not by the understanding's
own direct insight ... The "will" (the heart), therefore, lights the way for
the understanding and draws it with it into assent.
RATZINGER, PILGRIM FELLOWSHIP OF FAITH, supra note 150, at 22-25. (internal cita-
tions omitted)
153. DEus CARITAS EST, Supra note 6, 17.
154. Id. 13.
155. Id. 17. "True justice, justjustice can come into existence only when the
true God is recognized aright and orders his existence in a life with others on the
basis of God." RATZINGER, A TURNING PoIr, supra note 4, at 73.
156. DEUs CAITAS EST, supra note 6, 1 17. "The primacy of the invisible over
the visible and that of receiving over making" and "the leap of entrusting ourselves
to what cannot be seen." RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY, supra note
110, at 43-44.
157. "Calculable practical knowledge is limited by its very nature to the appar-
ent, to what functions, and does not represent the way in which to find truth itself,
which by its very method it has renounced." Id. at 46. "[U]nderstanding means
seizing and grasping as meaning the meaning which man has received as ground
.... We learn to grasp the ground on which we have taken our stand as meaning
and truth. Id. "Saying 'I believe that God exists' also implies opting for the view
that the logos-that is, the idea, freedom, love-stands not merely at the end but
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current problem.15 8 Pope Benedict, like Augustine, Christianizes Plato
but in doing so, he elects a different, simultaneously less Manichean and
less Hebraic point of intersection.
In this view, the renewal of the mind, which Christian love causes,
brings with it a corresponding enhancement in the character or quality of
cognition about the meaning of, and requirements of, practical action.
Pope Benedict states that, in the first instance, faith is able "to purify rea-
son" and to "assist[ ] reason be more fully itself."159 It is thus, historically
speaking, that God's gift to man of the Torah opened man's eyes to his
"true nature," and to the path leading to "true humanism."1 60 This re-
newal of reason occurs, for Pope Benedict, more specifically, through
the-in principle-unbounded "opening" of the mind, through the infu-
sion of the virtue of hope and patience. 16 1 As Pope Benedict states, "hope
also at the beginning; that is the originating and encompassing power of all be-
ing." Id. at 105.
158. Faith is ... the courage to exist and an awakening to the greatness
and breadth of what is real .... It seems to me important, precisely amid
the rising resentment against technical rationality, to emphasize clearly
the essential reasonableness of faith. In a criticism of the modem period,
which has long been going on, one must not reproach its confidence in
reason as such but only the narrowing of the concept of reason, which
has opened the door to irrational ideologies. But the mysterium, as faith
sees it, is not the irrational but rather the uttermost depths of the divine
reason, which our weak eyes are no longer able to penetrate.
RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT FOR EUROPE, supra note 4, at 104.
159. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 28(a). "Religion is a primordial reality
to man." RATZINGER, SALT OF THE EARTH, supra note 141, at 234.
For to believe as a Christian means in fact entrusting oneself to the mean-
ing which bears up me and the world; taking it as the firm ground on
which I stand fearlessly.., to believe as a Christian means understanding
our existence as answer to the word, the logos, that bears up and holds all
things. It means affirming that the meaning we do not make but can only
receive is already granted to us, so that we have only to take it and entrust
ourselves to it.
RATZINGER, INTRODUcTION TO CHRISTIANITY, supra note 110, at 43. "The funda-
mental liberation that the Church can give us is to permit us to stand in the hori-
zon of the eternal and to break out of the limits of our knowledge and
capabilities." RATZINGER, CALLED TO COMMUNION, supra note 104, at 145. "The
option of thinking that the world originates from reason, and not from unreason,
can be rationally maintained even today, though it must of course be formulated
in conversation with the genuine findings of natural science." RATZINGER, PILGRIM
FELLOWSHIP OF FAITH, supra note 150, at 291. Faith gives rise to "rational argu-
ment" the church advances. DEUS CAFRTAS EST, supra note 6, 28(a).
160. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 9. Christianity "inscribed by the Crea-
tor in man's very nature," "constantly revives and acts out this imperative, so often
profoundly obscured in the course of time." Id. 31.
161. "An encounter opening up... reason itself." Id. 28(a). As such it
counters a tendency of modernity.
We have limited ourselves to our own perspective, to the visible in the
widest sense, to what can be seized in our measuring grasp ... as a result,
a new concept of truth and reality has gradually developed in modem
thinking and living, a concept that holds sway, for the most part uncon-
sciously, as the assumption on which we think and speak and that can
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is practiced though the virtue of patience, which continues to do good
even in the face of apparent failure." 162 Faith, which is privileged to pos-
sess no mere long-term or bird's-eye view but the view of the eschatological
long-term, is able, unrestrictedly, to expand the scope of patience that one
can now count as "reasonable," "transform [ing] our impatience and our
doubts into the sure hope that God holds the world in his hands and that,
as the dramatic imagery of the end of the Book of Revelation points out, in
spite of all darkness he ultimately triumphs in glory." 163 Pope Benedict
observes, then, that love "is never 'finished' and complete." It freely
"throughout life ... changes and matures, and thus remains faithful to
itself."164 The process of inquiry in practical reasoning, thenceforth, re-
mains unbounded, "always open-ended" seeking always unrestrictedly to
form, where such is possible with integrity of will, "a community of...
thought" with others. 16 5
Depending on whether the will of the subject aligns itself with that of
God, the categories of reason become more or less illuminating of the
requirements of justice. The implication again is that descriptive-even
bureaucratic-reasoning about the goals of common action, on prima fa-
cie neutral terms, is possible without either falling into Augustinian de-
pravity or rising to Hegelian normative assurance. Options in politics
remain, in a sense, neutral means of advancing interests in the Kantian
sense. Rejecting the Kantian rejection of the Activist State, Pope Benedict
sees all of these options as elective according to the will of society. As
society is inspired by unrestricted love for all, these elected options in-
creasingly align themselves with the human good.
Pope Benedict observes that Christian love's influence on reason, far
from being reducible to any mere straightforward "purification" on rea-
son's own terms, in some sense, alters the "categories of reason" them-
selves, in fact, "opening new horizons beyond the sphere of reason." 1
6 6
This alteration arises through an alteration in the reality of the human
situation itself that Pope Benedict understands as having occurred in the
Christ event. Without the Atonement, no avenue of escape could be
imagined, as an existential matter, from an inescapable division of self
through conflict caused by the cognitively irreconcilable demands of "as-
cending" love-that draws towards the fulfillment of self, i.e., erotic love-
and of "descending," self-sacrificing, oblative love-that seeks the good of
only be overcome if it, too, is exposed to the test of consciousness. At this
point the function of nonscientific thinking becomes perceptible, that of
considering the unconsidered and bringing the human problems it raises
before the gaze of consciousness."
RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY, supra note 110, at 30-31.
162. DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 39.
163. See id. 39.
164. See id. 17.
165. See id.
166. See id. 28(a).
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all to the point of self-sacrifice, i.e., agapic love. In the mundane terminol-
ogy of ethical theory, Christ reconciles the apparently irreconcilable ethi-
cal demands of egoism and altruism.
Pope Benedict envisions that, in Christ, God himself has acted to alter
human reality-no less fundamentally, really, than by first creating it-by
reconciling forever and integrating both ways of loving. As mentioned
above, Pope Benedict understands the love that God fulfills in Christ prop-
erly to be his own eros, in loving us "against all reason" and even going so
far as to turn "his love against his justice."1 6 7 Yet, Pope Benedict sees God
doing so, paradoxically, through Christ's own agapic oblative gift of self-
sacrifice. Thus, in Christ, love and justice are, for the first time and for-
ever, reconciled in divine forgiveness of man's sin. Love is now called to
be simultaneously agapic and erotic; ascending and descending; affirma-
tive of self and self-sacrificing for others. 168
The consequence, for practical reason, of this change in the reality of
the human situation, is that, henceforth, simple formulas regarding the
requirements of justice in accountability for the past alone, for whatever
their apparent prior validity, are now simply "aufgehoben."'' 69 Opposition
between love-that is, care for the welfare of the person-and justice-
i.e., concern about a person's accountability for his moral desert-is to
some essential degree cancelled. Nor, can the contributions of teleologi-
cal and deontological ethics any more be integrated according to some
straightforward lexical priority. The Christian moral agent, acting with the
self-abandonment of a will to care beyond all measure as God does, 170
possesses now "an infallible intuition."''
The model of this intuition, at work for example at the Wedding at
Cana in Galilee, is the mind of Mary, the Mother of our Savior. 172 Far
from the stereotype of a woman's supposed 'nice' concern for local social
harmonies, this intuition is perhaps best described-with the appropriate
nuance of respect for the immaculate character of the Virgin's integrity
and intention-by Machiavelli's notion of untrammeled political rea-
son. 173 This intuition of love permits the Church to take people and polit-
167. See id. 10.
168. "Yet eros and agape-ascending love and descending love-can never be
completely separated. The more the two, in their different aspects find a proper
unity in the one reality of love, the more the true nature of love in general is
realized." See id. 7.
169. "We have seen that God's eros for man is also totally agape. This is not
only because it is bestowed in a completely gratuitous manner, without any previ-
ous merit, but also because it is love which forgives." See id. 10.
170. See id. 34.
171. See id. 42.
172. "The delicacy with which she recognizes the need of the spouses at Cana
and makes it known to Jesus." See id. 41.
173. Machiavelli writes:
I conclude then that fortune varying and men remaining fixed in their
ways, they are successful so long as these ways conform to circumstances,
but when they are opposed then they are unsuccessful. I certainly think
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ical regimes as it finds them. If they convert to greater reasonableness
under the Church's influence, so much the better. But, if they do not, the
Church can, nevertheless, in every situation, find an opening for benign
influence.
For Pope Benedict, the essential starting point of effective practical
reasoning on behalf of the Christian mission of universal service-and by
extension on behalf of politics generally in its separate sphere-remains,
always however and everywhere, the human acknowledgement that, while
the scope of our will is ideally unconditional and universal, the scope, in
the end, of our concrete and categorical action will be finite and will fall
far short of human need. Given the transcendence of the human being
imago dei, human need can be fully quantified only on a cosmic scale, and
only God is capable of so governing the cosmos that the fullness of this
need is met. After we have done all we can in service, we properly yield to
God in lamentation, but we also hope in God. 1 7 4 So central a role do
these essentially theological responses to social and political life have
within Pope Benedict's vision, that the basic virtue the vision recommends
for Christian social justice becomes piety, and the basic baseline activity
becomes prayer, with the tenor of his perspective as a whole beginning to
appear almost monastic. 1 75 The role models Pope Benedict sets out for
us, even as a matter of social justice, are, like St. Anthony of Egypt, monks
and saints. We are invited to await 'justice for the dead" and to commune
in prayer for justice, in a union of wills, with the dead in the community of
saints. 17
6
C. The Church's Direct Mission to the World
The same fundamental dichotomy separating the spheres of justice
and charity that leads Pope Benedict to insist that the Church's mission on
behalf of justice is indirect serves, in Pope Benedict's view, conversely, to
justify the Church's taking direct authority in organizing efforts at charity
within society, this role being the Church's opus proprium.1 7 7 The universal
call to service in love that all believers experience leads them, of necessity,
that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, for fortune is a woman,
and it is necessary, if you wish to master her... it can be seen that she lets
herself be overcome by the bold rather than by those who proceed coldly.
And, therefore, like a woman she is always a friend to the young, because
they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater audacity.
See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, The Prince, in THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 94 (Luigi
Ricci trans., E.R.P. Vincent rev. trans., Random House 1950).
174. See DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 1 38.
175. See id. 40 (citing "[i]n particular, the entire monastic movement.").
176. See id. 40. Pope Benedict cites the "presence of incomprehensible and
apparently unjustified suffering in the world... [o]ften we cannot understand why
God refrains from intervening . . . [w]e should continue asking this question in
prayerful dialogue before his face." Id. 38. Pope Benedict refers to "[tihe lives
of the saints . . . after death." Id. 42.
177. See id. 29. Cardinal Dulles observes that the Pope is discussing the
Church's mission of service (diakonia) within a traditional tripartite framework of
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to seek to organize themselves effectively to serve society. He believes that
it is the institutional Church's role to foster this organization of Christian
service as a form of social activity. 178 In this capacity, the Church is, but
for the ultimacy of its inspiration, on the same ground as all other volun-
tary intermediate social institutions.
The question arises of how the Church can simultaneously relinquish
any input into the structural justice of social life, per the strict bifurcation
of Pope Benedict's scheme, while proceeding within those structures to
advance its own particular vision of social service. And, indeed, Pope Ben-
edict believes that the Church may hold itself out to all political regimes as
a purveyor of charity without asking for a foundation in agreed principles
ofjustice or redress for past grievances.' 79 In this respect, he contrasts the
Church with Marxism which held love for concrete human beings hos-
tage.180 The challenge is to explain how an institutional commitment to
charitable outreach can forego a foundation in underlying commitments
in justice. Pope Benedict's answer is a Christian pragmatism that finds its
ground in the paradox of the Christ event, which as developed above, in
Pope Benedict's view, is one in which God's own love outraces his justice.
In this policy, he says that the Church has a coherent basis in the great
"Magna Carta" of the logic of love-requiring no further foundation,
which St. Paul extols in 1 Corinthians 13-34.181
Pope Benedict asserts that if the Church is to be effective in organiz-
ing projects of social beneficence, it must itself be organized. Just as he
does in his political and legal philosophy, Pope Benedict at this point in-
troduces a note of appreciation for the value of positive law as an excep-
tionally important instrumentality of beneficence. He lays a foundation
establishing that the Church has securely entrusted its charitable activity
from its beginning to oversight within its juridically defined structures, as
early as the narrative recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, and well in place
by the fourth to the sixth centuries in both the East and West, in the case
of the papacy, the Episcopal diocese and the monasteries.18 2 In contem-
porary terms, he strikes a note of quiet clarity in linking the Church's char-
ism of diakonia to the specific juridical structures of the Church's Code of
Canon Law, where he presents it as properly and hierarchically ordered
through the exercise of the offices of the papacy and episcopacy, with lo-
cal service being properly channeled through the parish structure. 183
the Church's "ministries of the word (kerygma), the ministry of worship (leitourgia)
and the ministry of service (diakonia)." See Dulles, supra note 7, at 249.
178. "The Church can never be exempted from practicing charity as an or-
ganized activity of believers." DEUs CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 29.
179. "We contribute to a better world only by personally doing good now,
with full commitment and wherever we have the opportunity, independently of
partisan strategies and programmes." Id. 31(b).
180. See id.
181. "This hymn must be the Magna Carta of all ecclesial service." Id. 34.
182. See id. 1 23.
183. See id. 32.
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While he does not present leadership in Christian service in support of
social justice as being exclusively clerical, he presents it as being necessa-
rily predominately so. He offers the lay/clerical distinction as having a
decisive formal role in allocating duties and functions in the Church's
ministry of social service. 184
An exposition of the ecclesiological dimension of Deus caritas est can-
not, moreover, be considered complete without a notation of Pope Bene-
dict's attitude towards bureaucracy within the Church itself. In his
seminal book Models of the Church, Cardinal Dulles, as an exercise in what
he termed "comparative ecclesiology," once found himself adding "institu-
tion," to the roster of other core concepts he identified as organizing di-
verse visions of the Church. 185 Each of the other "models" of the Church
Cardinal Dulles identified relied on an analogy or metaphor communicat-
ing a substantive theological concept expressing some aspect of the core
identity of the Church and thus could point to some unique stream of
spiritual life and energy it could provide where it was adopted, e.g., the
ideas of "Communion" or "Servant." 186 When it came to the institutional
model, however, Cardinal Dulles expressed some embarrassment at not
knowing quite how to categorize or evaluate the approach, other than to
suggest that many functionaries who zealously advanced it, without inter-
relation with another of the more theologically grounded concepts, would
do well to steep themselves in lectio divina capable of acquainting them
with concepts and metaphors possessing the theological content ensuring
that they would not make the error of equating spirit of the Church with
mindless bureaucracy. 18 7
In Deus caritas est, Pope Benedict has a response to precisely this point
addressed by Cardinal Dulles in Models of the Church, for Pope Benedict
represents the institutional model of the Church as, in itself, having a the-
ological ground. The Pope does not cite the Prayer of St. Francis in support
of his institutional vision of the Church, but he could easily do so: "Lord,
make me an instrument of Thy Peace." 188 He repeatedly proposes an im-
184. Pope Benedict cites "[t] he mission of the lay faithful." Id. 29. And, he
calls attention to the "[e]piscopal structure." Id. 32.
185. See generally AVERY DULLES, S.J., MODELS OF THE CHURCH (Image Books
1978).
186. See id. at 47-62, 89-102.
187. Cardinal Dulles writes:
Even the schema of Vatican I and the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius
XII, for all of their insistence on the Church as a "perfect society," never
identified the society with its institutional elements. They tempered the
institutional with more spiritual and organic conceptions, such as those
of the communion of grace or the Body of Christ. For a fuller under-
standing of moderate institutionalism, therefore, one must draw upon
the communitarian and mystical views of the Church ....
Id. at 50.
188. "The Christian's programme... is 'a heart which sees' . . . where love is
needed and acts accordingly." DEUs CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 31(b).
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age of Church as instrument.189 With a critical preamble of humility in-
sisting that we, at all times, show our good faith by acknowledging the
limits on what we can know and do, refrain from speaking and acting
when doing so is beyond the bounds of our legitimate powers, and turn in
prayer to the God who is able to know and do all that we cannot, Pope
Benedict insists for the Church, as for the State, that the principle of be-
neficence requires tireless dedication to the rationalization of all condu-
cive means to its ministry of social service. The development of highly
responsive and efficient channels of hierarchy within the church, as well as
the accumulation of the requisites for conducting not-for-profit business
enterprise on a large scale in the public interest are, for Pope Benedict, a
moral and spiritual imperative.
D. How Augustinian is Pope Benedict's Ecclesiology?
Having now described Pope Benedict's ecclesiology, it will have been
observed that some of its most central themes-its emphasis on procedu-
ral priorities, pragmatic accommodation and obedience-have a clearly
Augustinian provenance. The trajectory of development, however, from
Augustine's vision of the Church to that of Pope Benedict is not one
merely of continuity. The shifts in philosophy, elucidated above, turn out
to have significant implications for Pope Benedict's concept of Church,
particularly in reference to relation of Church and State. Augustine situ-
ates the Church in its essential reality in the "heavenly," as opposed to the
"earthly," realm (with the earthly realm existing for the heavenly; i.e., the
State existing to secure the conditions of the tranquility of peace for the
Church' 90 and the secular arm even available to secure the earthly en-
forcement of the Church's spiritual prerogatives).' 9 1 But Pope Benedict
situates the Church no less essentially in the realm of temporal social life
189. "There are times when the burden of need and our own limitations
might tempt us to become discouraged. But precisely then we are helped by the
knowledge that, in the end, we are only instruments in the Lord's hands ...." Id.
35. "Whoever loves Christ loves the Church, and desires the Church to be in-
creasingly the image and instrument of the love which flows from Christ." Id. 1 33.
190. For further discussion of Augustine's treatment of the purpose of the
state in his work, see CITY OF GOD, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
191. Augustine justifies the "emperor ... [who has] .. .believed in Christ, so
as to serve Him in the cause of piety by enacting laws against impiety." St. Augus-
tine, Treatise on the Correction of the Donatists, in NICENE AND POsT-NICENE FATHERS OF
THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 633, 640 (First Series vol. IV) (Philip Schaff ed., Eerdmans
Publishing Company 1979). He justifies the use of imperial force against dissent-
ers from Catholic orthodoxy by reference to the gospel account of compulsion in
the parable of the wedding feast:
Whence also the Lord Himself bids the guests in the first instance to be
invited to His great supper, and aftqrwards compelled; for on His servants
making answer to Him, 'Lord, it is done as Thou hast commanded, and
yet there is room,' He said to them, 'Go out into the highways and
hedges, and compel them to come in.' In those, therefore, who were first
brought in with gentleness, the former obedience is fulfilled; but in those
who were compelled, the disobedience is avenged. For what else is the
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(with the Church existing for the society and for the State, assisting both to
remain oriented to the due requirements of practical reason and assisting
the State in its carrying out and administration of the social welfare func-
tion). Far from obtaining the State's coercive support for advancing its
spiritual identity, the Church, in Pope Benedict's scheme, agrees to be
anonymous as it witnesses to its Christian faith in complete silence, while it
carries out quasi-governmental activities. 192 In its basic features, the
Church hierarchy even appears, in Deus caritas est, to receive its primary
justification from the imperative of carrying out its universal mission of
service beyond the bounds of the Church itself, rather than through its
regard for proclamation and the sacraments. 19 3 The Church, moreover,
with its heavy weight of responsibility for universal service through highly
organized welfare and relief efforts, is represented by Pope Benedict as
obtaining spiritual consolation from its everyday sacraments and procla-
mation, experienced as within an extraordinary "heavenly sphere" sepa-
rated from its own essentially temporal one in what would seem to be
monastic sanctuaries of prayers of praise, lamentation and intercession.19 4
IV. POPE BENEDICT'S VISION OF THE LEGAL ORDERING or
CHURCH-STATE RELATION
Pope Benedict's concept of both Church and State extends in a seam-
less whole to the detailed articulation of intrinsically institutional forms.
In his encyclical's exposition, the Church, in its essential nature, finds nec-
meaning of 'Compel them to come in,' after it had previously said, 'Bring
in,' and the answer had been made . . .?
Id. at 642 (citing Luke 14:22-23).
192. "Charity, furthermore, cannot be used as a means of engaging in what is
nowadays considered proselytism .... A Christian knows when it is time to speak
of God and when it is better to say nothing, and let love alone speak." DEUS
CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 31 (c). Pope Benedict observes that Church hierarchy
is drawn from this function. See id. 25(a). "[L]ike the ministry of Word and
Sacrament, it too has been an essential part of her mission from the very begin-
ning." Id. 1 32.
193. "In conformity with the [E]piscopal structure of the Church, the Bish-
ops, as successors of the Apostles, are charged with primary responsibility for carry-
ing out in the particular Churches the program set forth in the Acts of the Apostles."
Id. 32. The Church's service "must not be inspired by ideologies aimed at im-
proving the world, but should rather be guided by the faith which works through
love (cf. Gal 5:6)." Id. 33.
194. The Pope references, in an iconic manner, "the saints, who exercised
charity in an exemplary way" mentioning Martin of Tours "the soldier who became
a monk and a bishop" and Saint Anthony the Abbot. See id. 40. Pope Benedict
writes:
This explains the great emphasis on hospitality, refuge and care of the
infirm in the vicinity of the monasteries. It also explains the immense
initiative of human welfare and Christian formation, aimed above all at
the very poor, who became the object of care firstly for the monastic and
mendicant orders ....
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essary expression in canon law; the State in constitutional law. 195 Not sur-
prisingly, the key to the vision of Deus caritas est is that the dualism that
Pope Benedict envisions between Church and politics, as a philosophical
and theological matter, translates soundlessly into an interlocking juridical
scheme of Church and State. Pope Benedict's Church is perfectly formu-
lated to function within the dichotomous terms of the civil law on Church
and State. 19 6 In his vision, the Church, in all its structural dimensions, fits
seamlessly into interface with the constitutional forms and categories of
the modern State.
In one direction, this interface is mediated by the concept of the
Church as subject to the authority of the State. In the other, it is mediated
by that of "subsidiarity" understood juridically as a concept in civil law-no
less than as a concept in political philosophy' 9 7-according to which the
Church enjoys a twofold expectation: (1) as one intermediate social insti-
tution among others, the Church is free to leaven and animate society; 198
and (2) as the organizer of charitable activities, the Church, like other and
perhaps more than other intermediate social institutions, is to be given
corresponding juridical recognition. 199
195. Pope Benedict carefully lays out the history of the Church's acknowl-
edgement of the autonomous but interlocking authority of the state, especially in
questions of social welfare. He starts with the sixth century in Egypt in which the
Church's relief work had "full juridical standing" acknowledged by the "civil au-
thorities themselves" and utilized by those authorities to implement governmental
famine relief. St. Ambrose's account of St. Lawrence deacon of Rome presented
the Church's poor relief as satisfying the state's right to tax and penalty on the
Church. See id. 23. He depicts the policies of Julian the Apostate in the fourth
century as illustrating that Church and State have concurrent jurisdiction with the
state that has "equivalent activity of its own . . . along side the 'system of the
Church's Charity.'" Id. 1 24. Regarding canon law, Pope Benedict writes "in gen-
eral terms of the Bishop's responsibility for coordinating the different works of the
apostolate with due regard for their proper character." Id. 28(a) (citing Canon
394 and the Directory for the Pastoral Ministry of Bishops).
196. Pope Benedict writes:
Fundamental to Christianity is the distinction between what belongs to
Caesar and what belongs to God, in other words, the distinction between
Church and State, or, as the Second Vatican Council puts it, the auton-
omy of the temporal sphere .... The two spheres are distinct, yet always
interrelated.
Id. 1 28(a) (citation omitted). "The opportunity for a free Church in a free state.
Here are opportunities for a more vital, because more deeply and more freely
grounded, faith, which, however, must fight against being subjectivized and which
must continue to try to speak its message publicly." See RATZINGER, SALT OF THE
EARTH, supra note 141, at 240.
197. Pope Benedict writes of the ideal of "a State... in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity." See DEus CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 28(b); see also DEus
CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 26.
198. The Church "generously acknowledges and supports initiatives arising
from the different social forces and combines spontaneity with closeness to those
in need. The Church is one of those living forces." Id. 28(b).
199. The Church "does not operate collaterally, but acts as a subject with di-
rect responsibility." Id. 29. State agencies and humanitarian associations work-
ing to promote this "led to the birth and the growth of many forms of cooperation
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Pursuant to the first concept, the Church renounces all power to con-
trol politics or the State. Building on the second, the Church recognizes
the properly secular impulse directing the State in its involvement in social
service; 20 0 acknowledges that its eligibility to participate flows from its effi-
ciency and humanity with which it assists the State rather than from any
properly religious warrant;20 1 and agrees to avoid all forms of prosyletiza-
tion. 20 2 With these provisos in place, Pope Benedict considers the
Church, in effect, to share jurisdiction in the work of organized charity
both with the State, and with other nongovernmental agencies in soci-
ety.20 3 He cedes a role in social service to the State, but he emphasizes the
benefit to the State in the form of efficiency and quality of service in dele-
gating as much as possible of it to the Church, as an intermediate institu-
tion.204 Pope Benedict argues that mutual practical advantages militate,
from both perspectives, that Church and State cooperate substantially in
the delivery of social services. Efficiency and effectiveness should recom-
mend the scheme to the State. Christians, as individuals, should favor this
arrangement as well, because "civil society" can do so much more to allevi-
ate need than any number of individual actors.
20 5
The tension between separate spheres, which in Augustine and Aqui-
nas occurs at the level of integration on the level of philosophical catego-
ries, i.e., the requirements of justice or the possibilities of grace. It is
critical to note that the same cannot be said of the encyclical's schema for
relating Church and State. The unity that Pope Benedict there establishes
on the theoretical level does not account for the final unity of his schema.
Theoretically, his schema draws its unity from the role common to both of
his basic spheres of the will's orientation to love's imperative of doing
good. But when one turns to the "earthly realm"-i.e., Pope Benedict's
between State and Church agencies . . . giv[ing] a Christian quality to the civil
agencies too .... Numerous organizations for charitable or philanthropic pur-
poses have also been established." Id. 30(b).
200. Pope Benedict depicts the policies of Julian the Apostate in the fourth
century as illustrating that Church and state have concurrent jurisdiction with the
State "equivalent activity of its own" along side the "system of the Church's Char-
ity." Id. 24. For a discussion of Pope Benedict's description of Church and State
as having concurrent jurisdiction, see supra note 197 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of his treatment of secular reform, see DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 6,
31.
201. The Pope cites, "transparent operation." See id. 30(b). He depicts the
policies ofJulian the Apostate in the fourth century as illustrating that Church and
State have concurrent jurisdiction with the state "equivalent activity of its own"
along side the "system of the Church's Charity." Id. 24.
202. "Charity, furthermore, cannot be used as a means of engaging in what is
nowadays considered proselytism.... A Christian knows when it is time to speak of
God and when it is better to say nothing and to let love alone-speak." Id. 31(c).
203. See id. 30(b).
204. The Pope cites "their transparent operation" and "adequate humanita-
rian solutions to the social and political problems of the day." See id.
205. "The solidarity shown by civil society thus significantly surpasses that
shown by individuals." Id. I 30(a).
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realm of practical reason or politics-one finds elements of necessity that
simply cannot be traced to his theoretical starting points, thus far named,
if they are considered alone. One example is the necessity he posits of
distinguishing State and society. Another is the necessity of the direct-
indirect distinction as the equation for assigning the Church its role in
relation to each. When one turns to discover the source of these elements
of necessity, one confronts the Holy Father's intention of adumbrating,
more specifically, a philosophy of law. To account for the totality of the
picture he describes, one must add the premise that the desideratum is a
comprehensive juridical framework. This framework is justified as an "in-
strumentality of beneficence." It, in turn, requires that all underlying phil-
osophical and theological assumptions be comprehensively translated into
juridically workable terms and that, as this occurs, "open-textured" or un-
derdetermined elements be given content according to the principle of
"utilitas."
In contrast to the resolution of dualist tensions in the systems of Kant
and Augustine alike-through an interlocking relationship between mate-
rial consequences, on the one hand, and moral or spiritual transcendence
on the other, such that human institutions in those systems find them-
selves with one foot in one dimension, and the other in another, with
tangible institutions pointing to intangible principles as the true measure
of human integrity, and vice versa-the resolution of dualism in Deus
caitas est appears to occur, rather, on the level of the interlocking jurisdic-
tions as a matter of law. In short, in Deus caitas est, Pope Benedict offers a
philosophy of law. In his vision as represented in the encyclical, Church
points to State, and State to Church. In this resolution, the tangible forms
of a dual institutional life are the product ultimately of a policy decision
pointing to a single intangible value of beneficence as the goal of human
action in both religious and secular-political perspectives.
V. CONCLUDING COMMENT AND EVALUATION
In Deus caritas est, Pope Benedict XVI invigorates the concept of
Church-State dualism that Cardinal Dulles identifies as the central and sa-
lient characteristic of authentic Catholic thought on politics. In order to
do so, Pope Benedict draws on an important strand of Catholic thought
found at the core of the Church's living tradition. The theological and
philosophical basis of this thought is, namely, Augustinian. But Pope Ben-
edict's approach is-at certain points-other than Augustinian, for he
makes an overdue and laudable change in Augustine by expressly remov-
ing a Manichean strain in the Augustinian schema suggesting that the dy-
namic of the temporal world may be one of sin as such. In contrast to
Augustine, Pope Benedict affirms that self-love is prima facie good, and
that the love of others, as implanted by the Creator in human nature, sur-
vives the fall to some definite degree intact.
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In a certain respect, Pope Benedict, in this regard, sidesteps Augus-
tine to reconnect with his precursor Plato on the possibility of in-
nerworldly realization of the good. At the same time, Pope Benedict
implicitly relies on Kant to support a vision of a civil society based in free-
dom in place of the organic social hierarchy of Plato. By these adjust-
ments, Pope Benedict paves the way for the Church to participate in
modernity, allowing the Church to endorse the temporal world as a posi-
tive forum for constructive, in-common human action and to take its place
as an intermediate association within human society.
He supplements the otherworldly "Augustinian" dimension of the
Church's identity with a dimension that is essentially, rather than acciden-
tally, temporal, i.e., the Church is, for Pope Benedict, one association
among the many associations constitutive of human society. By relying on
the elevation of the human will in divine compassion, rather than on the
power of the human intellect as such, Pope Benedict simultaneously
avoids unduly lavish epistemological claims about the Church's substantive
supernatural knowledge. The Church, as an intermediate social organiza-
tion, shares with its peers-admittedly as experienced from a perspective
purporting to be much "longer" than most others imaginable-a concern
for the projects of practical reason on behalf of the human good. Criti-
cally, Pope Benedict elevates the pursuit of this social identity, grounded
in an equal concern for the social good of unbelievers and believers alike,
as a principle bulwark of the Church's own internal identity even as it
undertakes its ministry of Christian proclamation and administers the sac-
raments. Pope Benedict's Church is, in its essential nature, the Church in
the Modern World.20 6 For all their differences, the Church and the State
have in common concern for acting on behalf of love or benevolence, i.e.,
practical action or beneficence. The basic attitude Pope Benedict
prescribes for the authenticity of both viewpoints is a humanizing acknowl-
edgement of finite efficacy. Each must confess: "Yet to Come, the Apoca-
lypse Is Not Now. The time to serve, as efficiently as possible, is, however,
now.
On a theological and philosophical level, the complex intersecting
dualisms comprising Pope Benedict's revisionist Augustinian universe find
their reconciliation within the unity of the human person who loves both
within the limits of the possible and within the infinite compassion of God
through Christ. Parallel, however, to Augustine's functional reconciliation
within the temporal order of the State, Pope Benedict's dualism also finds
reconciliation at the concrete level of law in the interlocking institutional
unity of Church and State. Drawing on elements in Kant and Plato, Pope
206. See Gaudium Et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,
in RENEWING THE EARTH: CATHOLIC DOCUMENTS ON PEACE, JUSTICE AND LIBERATION
3, at 179 (DavidJ O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon eds. 1977) ("[The council]
offers to mankind the honest assistance of the Church in fostering that brother-
hood of all men which corresponds to the destiny of theirs.").
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Benedict forges a comprehensive vision that is inherently institutional in a
way that would have been impossible in Augustine.
Working within the framework of modern constitutionalism, Pope
Benedict favors an unambiguous juridical structure, comprehensive in
scope, ordering the cooperation between the Church-which juridically is
constituted in its offices as a matter of canon law-and the State-which is
constituted juridically within its positive constitutional order. This struc-
ture is envisioned as allowing both to do or act effectively on behalf of
beneficence, both conceived as justice and love. He simultaneously re-
tains the inherently "elitist" perspective of Plato and Augustine regarding
the technical mastery of means, while on the level of ends, he provides a
basis for blending this approach with the modern preference for
democracy.
Critical in understanding Pope Benedict's vision is the realization that
his theological and philosophical premises, while deeply rooted in ancient
and continuous Catholic tradition, are drawn from one particular strand
of that tradition. Other alternative patterns, associated for example with
the Thomist/Aristotlean line of Catholic thought, are no less available to
Catholic thought on politics after Pope Benedict, as the Pontiff has made
his selection in leading the Church at this moment in time. The unity
Pope Benedict's synthesis proposes follows within his philosophy of law
not even this follows strictly from his particular theological and philosoph-
ical premises, to the exclusion of other possible alternatives. Rather, this
philosophy of law takes its more concrete shape only within the tradition
of modern constitutionalism with its treatment of the relations of Church
and State. As a legal construct, it also includes in its more detailed con-
ceptualization concrete choices which find their validity in their contribu-
tion to a system of law that works effectively. These elements in the Pope's
rendition will be subject to being seasoned as they evolve in practice under
the stresses of life and experience. 20 7
In a global technocratic world in which the welfare, and indeed sur-
vival, of billions of us co-depend on prompt, effective and comprehensive
governmental response to developing problems, Pope Benedict has fash-
ioned a set of concepts that support the cultivation of all necessary instru-
mental means for the care of humanity. He has done so, moreover, by
framing a system of thought that places the lever that moves the world in
the charge of free and intelligent decision through practical reason rather
than the obsessive consolidation of power or the grip of inhuman ideolo-
gies. In a world in which Christian values are often advanced from what
would seem to be the posture of a small minority, Pope Benedict situates
207. For example, American constitutional law once relied on a concept of
dual federalism and the direct-indirect distinction with certain parallels to ele-
ments in Pope Benedict's conceptualization. In this separate and, in itself, unre-
lated setting, this conceptualization eventually underwent alteration under the
pressure of the economic crisis of the Great Depression. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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the Church 20 8 so as to maximize its immediate and maximal impact on
outcomes.
The seamlessness with which Pope Benedict brings all intangible val-
ues to an alignment that supports the instrumental efficacy of two inter-
locking bureaucracies is a credit to his genius as ajurisprudent for he has
given us a brilliantly articulated philosophy/theology of law. 20 9 But, then
again, the perfection of any apparently closed system invites human tran-
scendence itself to seek assurance that there really is more. If it is to retain
its resiliency, Pope Benedict's schema must be refreshed by constant inter-
play with the mind of the Church, which is fully alive theologically and
philosophically, and with the praxis of the Church which, while fully re-
spectful of the legal dimension, is not precisely bounded by it.
If the schema Pope Benedict sets out, precisely because of its elegance
and completeness as a philosophy of law, lost its living link to the richer
and even more apparently chaotic mind and practice of the Church, it
could suffer a regrettable set back for the Church. The danger can be
perhaps best articulated by considering the design by which the palace
and grounds of a seventeenth or eighteenth century European SchloB is
laid out according to the illusion of perfect and limitless perspective, com-
municating the unlimited efficacy of reason on behalf of the cause of the
State. On the SchloB grounds, one customarily found a Magdalene
Chapel or Magdalene to which the ruler could repair to restore his
soul. 2 10 Our response is mixed at best, as we admire and yet dizzy with the
208. See DEus CARITAS EST, supra note 6, 18, 36 (citing Blessed Teresa of
Calcutta as role model).
209. Pope Benedict writes:
In the Old Testament tradition, the decisive action in Moses' activity as
mediator is not the act of leading the people out of Egypt but the act of
handing on the Law at Mount Sinai. It is only through this that the Exo-
dus for the foreign land takes on meaning and stability. For the people is
set free and becomes a free nation of its own only by becoming a legal
community. Lack of freedom is the condition of being without law. This
is why the gift of the law is the real establishment of liberation [of
course,]-and of a law that is truly justice, namely right order in relation
to one another, in relationship to Creation and in relationship to the
creator.
RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT, supra note 4, at 73.
210. In response to the endorsement by Council of Trent (1545-1563) of the
devotional value of religious art, the Counter-Reformation Baroque developed its
own unique artistic vision. A favorite theme was the penitent Mary Magdalene. An
example is "the Magdalene... alone in prayer, seated before a crucifix and skull,
engaged in the very spiritual exercises that the owner of the altar might well have
performed while kneeling before it." See Michael K. Komanecky, Private Devotional
Altars of the Baroque, ANTIQUES, Oct. 2005, at 138, 140. This is part of the "tradition
of luxurious and elaborate private devotional altars extending from the late six-
teenth until the early eighteenth century ... [and s]uperbly crafted religious ob-
jects made in Augsburg and other European centers . I..." d. at 140, 143. Markus
Reisenleitner writes:
Representing Baroque urbanity as an outcome of the deliberate acts of
the dynastic rulers and their entourage, who used them as metaphors or
stages for the self-presentation of territorial consolidation clearly perpetu-
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uncanny sense that the entire Baroque scene might suddenly devolve into
a stage set-with even the doors and windows of the Magdalene Chapel
part of the facade. With the loss of its living foundation in the mind and
practice of the Church, Pope Benedict's schema would in principle run
into this difficulty. It would be an acceptable loss if the consolation and
refuge available in the cult of the Saints-as beautifully portrayed in Deus
caritas est, akin to the Magdalene Chapel on the Baroque Estate-suddenly
became inaccessible, with bureaucracy simply ascendant.
A relatively small emendation to Pope Benedict's framework would
serve substantially to set aside this danger. Parallel to the concession of
the State of space to the living forces of society, as a matter of civil society,
the institutional Church must concede space to the living forces of diverse
impulses of Christian life in the Church in a sphere of freedom that can-
not be reduced to the laity following the injunctions of the hierarchy. In
this dimension of the Church's life, hierarchical distinctions do not have
currency as such. St. Paul's Letter to the Galatians reminds us that "in Christ
there is neither male nor female, slave nor free. '21 1 Is it not equally true
that, at a certain point, 'in Christ there is neither clerical nor lay'?
Underlying this newest papal encyclical, as underlying Christianity it-
self, there is, moreover, an ever-present basic gamble. In the case of Deus
caritas est it is this: the tether of civilization to both a common language of
practical reason and to Christian faith has, by the Pope's own account,212
ates intentional self-assertions of the absolutist system .... In the wider
context of counter-reformatory absolutism, popular culture practices
were transformed, the carnevalesque and subversive elements disciplined,
and a privileged space carved out for an elite culture based on represen-
tation and glorification, rather than subversion and topsy-turvy worlds of
inversion and randomness.
Markus Reisenleitner, A Palace with View: Imagining Europe in the Baroque City, 6
Spaces of Identity 167, 176 (Aug. 2006), available at, http://www.yorku.ca/soi/
_Vol_6 2/_PDF/Reisenleitner.pdf; see also Germain Bazin, Baroque and Rococo
(Thames and Hudson 1998). For a description of Nymphenburg and its Magda-
lene Chapel, see BAROQUE AND Rococo: ARCHITECTURE AND DECORATION
(Anthony Blunt ed., Harper & Row 1982). For an illustrated survey of Baroque
styles in various European countries, see generally BAROQUE EUROPE (Harald
Busch & Bernd Lohse eds., Macmillan 1962); Eberhard Hempel, BAROQUE ART
AND ARCHITECTURE OF CENTRAL EUROPE (Penguin Books 1977); Julius Held and
Donald Posner, SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ART: BAROQUE PAINTING,
SCULPTURE, AND ARCHITECTURE (Harry N. Abrams, Inc. 1972).
211. St. Paul's letter to the Galatians states:
For all of you who were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with
Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free
person, there is not male and female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.
And if you belong to Christ, then you are Abraham's descendent, theirs
according to the promise.
Galatians 3:27-29 (New American Bible).
212. In a speech at the University of Regensburg, Pope Benedict said:
This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the dis-
turbing pathologies of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when
reason is so reduced that questions of religion and ethics no longer con-
cern it. Attempts to construct an ethic from the rules of evolution or
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become rather uncertain. The construct Pope Benedict offers in this en-
cyclical seeks to vindicate the continuing unrestricted reach of both practi-
cal reason and faith, over the mechanism of government and the dynamics
of social life, notwithstanding the relatively small resources of the still ex-
tant Christian community. This act of faith, like that of the life of Blessed
Teresa of Calcutta whose tiny shadow filled the globe, merits the most
profound admiration.
In choosing the papal name of Benedict, the Pontiff undoubtedly
meant to signal his own conviction that the cause of civilization required a
return to the apostolic bedrock of Benedict of Nursia, the father of West-
ern monasticism, and arguably the father of modern europe. In propos-
ing the program of Deus caritas est, Pope Benedict suggests that this
strategy can be combined with moving forward within the status quo. He,
with courage and brilliant presence of mind, gambles that this maneuver
will work, and his contribution might just be the decisive step ensuring
that this is so. But as the Church, thinks with him, it is still permitted to
ask, what if the status quo breaks apart? In his book, After Virtue, Alasdair
McIntyre, observing the same decline that is of concern to Pope Benedict,
counseled an alternate course. As he considered the dark ages already to
be upon us, he counseled a return to the monasteries.2 1 3 Would this, in
fact, be a suitable back-up plan if the total institutional edifice which Deus
caritas est seeks to assist in upholding either crumbles or, worse, turns out
to instrumentalize those, like beneficence-serving Christians, seeking to
utilize it, or otherwise to dehumanize them? If not, is there another?
from psychology and sociology, end up being simply inadequate....
Before I draw the conclusions to which all this has been leading, I must
briefly refer to the third stage of dehellenization, which is now in
progress.
ADDRESS AT REGENSBURG, supra note 13.
213. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed., Univ. of Notre Dame
Press 1984). MacIntyre writes:
A crucial turning point in that earlier history [in which the Roman em-
pire declined into the Dark Ages] occurred when men and women of
good will turned aside from the task of shoring up the Roman imperium
... to achieve instead... the construction of new forms of community
within which the moral life could be sustained so that both morality and
civility might survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness. If my
account of our moral condition is correct, we ought also to conclude that
for some time now we too have reached that turning point .... [T]he
new dark ages . . . are already upon us .... This time however the
barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been
governing us for quite some time .... We are waiting not for a Godot,
but for another-doubtless very different-St. Benedict.
Id. at 263.
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